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Abstract
DENISE WHALEN: Essays on Disability and Employment.
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie.)
Despite the growing prevalence of disability among prime age men and strong correlations
between disability and negative employment outcomes, few economic analyses address the
avenues through which disability may influence these observed outcomes. Particularly, the
impact of disability on employment decisions of disabled workers who remain employed is
unknown. In this research, I focus on employment transitions and occupational choice, and
the role these employment outcomes play as contributors to disability status and the observed
difference in wages of working age males. Based on a dynamic framework of employment
transitions and disability over time, the empirical model estimates equations for employer
and occupational changes, occupational choice, disability status, and wages of men. The
analyses are conducted using longitudinal data on individuals from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation and data on occupations from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles. A nonlinear random effects joint estimation technique accounts for both permanent and
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity that may influence employment transitions, wages, and
disability. The results suggest that moderately disabled workers are 23 percent more likely to
change occupations and/or employers compared to non-disabled men and that these transitions
contribute negatively to wages through reductions in tenure. Furthermore, disabled individuals
are found to select into occupations with low requirements of most job characteristics, most
significantly reasoning and math. While the majority of these job characteristics have only
a small impact on disability status, they have a large and significant effect on wages. The
importance of controlling for occupational choice is also revealed, as the marginal effect of
characteristics on wages differs across analyses that do and do not control for endogenous
occupation selection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Disabled Americans are an economically disadvantaged group. They
work less, earn less, and earn lower wages when they do work.”
- DeLeire (2000)
The number of people in the United States with a disability has been steadily increasing
over the past several decades. This upward trend has elicited much concern over the welfare
of the elderly and near elderly, and has generated interest among economists in the effect
of disability on medical care consumption and retirement decisions. However, comparatively
little is understood about the employment patterns and wages of prime age disabled workers
despite the increasing frequency of disability among this group. In 2006, the U.S. Census
Bureau reported that almost 13 percent of men aged 21-64 were disabled.1 Furthermore, the
Social Security Administration has found that a 20 year old worker has a 30 percent chance
of becoming disabled before reaching retirement age.2 Supporting this notion, a 2004 study
by Lakdawalla et al. using National Health Interview Study data from 1984-2000 found that
disability reports among the elderly have actually fallen while reports of those under age 50
have increased. The authors note that this trend is especially prevalent among those aged
30-49.
Disability is an important concern in the realm of economics as it is negatively correlated
1US Census Bureau, 2006 ACS. Data available at: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/2006acs.html
2Social Security Administration Disability planner. http://www.ssa.gov/dibplan/index.htm
with employment and wage outcomes. It has been well documented that persons with a
disability receive lower wages, earning 16 to 18 percent less than non-disabled workers (Baldwin
and Johnson, 2000; DeLeire, 2001). The combination of low employment and low wages may
help explain why over 20 percent of the disabled live in poverty compared to less than 8 percent
of those without a disability.3 In order to assist this group, many social programs have been
created and in 2006 over 91 billion dollars was spent on Social Security Disability Insurance
payments alone.4 These payments are only available to the disabled who do not participate in
substantial gainful activity. Many other federal programs such as Ticket to Work, an incentive
program for employers to hire disabled workers, are also only available to disabled individuals
who are not gainfully employed. However, many disabled individuals are capable of working
and continue to work following the onset of a disability.
While historically the majority of legislation regarding disability has focused on supporting
disabled workers who are unable to work, the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
enacted laws to protect disabled workers. The ADA is an important civil rights act that pro-
hibits discrimination in the hiring, firing, pay, and promotion of qualified disabled individuals.5
Additionally, the act requires firms of 15 or more employees to provide “reasonable accom-
modations” to disabled workers. These accommodations may include flexible work hours,
equipment, assistants, and other such work modifications that do not impose undue hardship
on the employer. Thus, a goal of the ADA was to limit job turnover among disabled workers.
However, not all employers are required to make or capable of making all accommodations
requested by disabled workers and many more may not provide a welcoming atmosphere to
a disabled employee. Furthermore, certain health limitations may render the individual inca-
pable of performing required job tasks, necessitating an exit from the occupation. Therefore,
even in the post-ADA era, disabled workers may still have a high rate of job turnover.
This research adds to the current literature on disability by estimating two different models
3US Census Bureau, 2006 ACS. Data available at: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/2006acs.html
4SSA Annuals Statistical Supplement: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2007/highlights.html
5For more information on the Americans with Disabilities Act, refer to www.ada.gov.
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of disability and employment outcomes for men ages 25 to 60, where the second model builds
upon the first. The first model is a dynamic model of employer and occupational change,
wages, and disability status. Using the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), the direct impact of disability on employment transitions and the indirect
impact of disability on wages through tenure is analyzed. As tenure is valuable to employers,
if disabled workers change employers or occupations frequently, it may be reflected in lower
wages. Since employment transitions are endogenous, modeling employer and occupational
change produces unbiased estimates of the impact of tenure on wages. The second model
analyzes occupational choice and disability using the SIPP and Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT). The DOT provides an objective measure of occupational characteristics, which
are used as a basis for occupational choice among workers. Controlling for endogenous selection
into an occupation, I then estimate the effect that these characteristics have on disability status.
Although disabilities may occur independent of employment, there is a strong link between
work and health, and this research attempts to specifically identify several of the pathways
through which this relationship occurs.
In conducting estimation, one must be aware of individual variables that are unobserved by
the researcher that my affect both self-reported disability status and employment outcomes.
To control for this unobserved heterogeneity, correlation across the associated error terms in all
equations is allowed. The equations are simultaneously estimated using a dynamic nonlinear
random effects joint estimation technique that accounts for both permanent and time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity.
Estimates from this analysis suggest that in a given four-month period a moderately dis-
abled worker is 2.5 percentage points (or 23 percent) more likely to change occupations and/or
employers than a non-disabled worker. These changes are found to have a significant negative
impact on the wage rate of a moderately disabled worker. Disabled workers are also found
to select into certain occupations, namely those that have low requirements of most occupa-
tional characteristics. Many of these characteristics effect disability. For example, working
with inanimate objects (referred to in the DOT and in this paper as “things”) and language
are found to decrease the probability of a moderate disability and working with data increases
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the likelihood of a moderate limitation. Occupational characteristics are also found to have a
significant effect on hourly wages.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two reviews the measure
of disability and previous literature related to the proposed research. Chapter three lays out
the conceptual framework. Chapter four describes the empirical model and the random effects
technique used to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. The next chapter describes
the Survey of Income and Program Participation and Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the
data used in the analysis. Chapter six presents and discusses the results, and chapter seven
concludes.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Disability
Measurement of disability has been a question underlying disability research for many
years. It is commonly acknowledged that disability and health are distinct, although perhaps
correlated, measures but the appropriate definition of disability is still under debate. A com-
mon measure of disability is some variation of a self-report of a work limitation. This definition
is supported by the notion that only an individual can truly gauge his own ability to work, but
brings up issues regarding the subjectivity of the measure. Other objective measures such as
difficulty with activities of daily living (ADLs) and specific health conditions have also been
cited as important indicators of disability status, but perhaps miss the relationship between
health and work. In the following subsection I discuss the measure of disability I use in this
research as well as alternative definitions.
The measure of disability available in the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) is based on the response to the question of whether a person has “a physical, mental,
or other health condition that limits the kind or amount of work” he can perform. This
measure is often referred to as a work limiting disability and is the only disability definition
provided in many data sets. The definition is very similar to the definition of disability used by
the Americans with Disabilities Act which defines an individual with a disability as a person
who “has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities; has a record of such an impairment; or is regarded as having such an impairment.”
Several studies have found the self-reported measure of disability to be superior to other
indicators of disability. It has been noted that objective measures such as specific health
conditions and medical reports measure health and not the capacity to work. The use of
such objective measures may lead to bias in estimating the impact of disability on employ-
ment (Bound, 1991). Furthermore, using objective measures to instrument self-reports may
create more bias than when self-reports alone are used (Bound, 1991). Several researchers
have concluded that self-reported disability is an accurate reflection of ability to work and
empirical analyses using such a measure produce unbiased results of the impact of disability
on employment (Stern, 1989; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; Benitez-Silva et al., 2004).
Many other researchers, however, have concluded that self-reported disability is correlated
with unobservables that also impact employment decisions (Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985;
Bazzoli, 1985; Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Kreider, 1999). Specifically, several potential
problems have been raised with the measure. One issue, known as the justification hypothesis,
is that an individual may report having a disability to justify his exit from the labor force
or other labor market decisions. Thus, measures of the effect of disability on employment
status, for example, would be overstated. Furthermore, disability partially determines receipt
of compensation from several government programs such as Social Security Disability Insur-
ance and Worker’s Compensation. The desire to receive these types of assistance may induce
individuals to report that they are disabled. A competing effect is the stigma that one might
feel with classifying himself as having a disability. This stigma would cause individuals to
underreport disability. Finally, even if workers are not justifying non-employment or hiding
their disabilities, the question itself is subjective and thus leads to measurement error. Inter-
pretation of disability and ability to work may differ across individuals. See Bound (1991) for
a comprehensive review and comparison of self-reported measures to objective measures.
In this dissertation research I allow self-reported disability to be determined by unobserv-
ables that may be correlated with other outcomes of interest such as employment and wages.
I model permanent and time-varying unobserved factors influencing disability status and em-
ployment outcomes using a flexible random effects maximum likelihood estimation known as
6
the Discrete Factor Random Effects method. A detailed description of this approach is pre-
sented in Section 4.2.
2.2 Disability Legislation
Although there are many pieces of legislation regarding disabled individuals, and even more
policies that affect a disproportionate percentage of the disabled population, in this section I
focus on five pieces of disability legislation. The Social Security Disabilities Act and Supple-
mental Security Act are both safety net programs that help many disabled individuals who are
unable to work. The Ticket to Work Program aims to return disabled individuals to work. The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Individuals with Disabilities Education Act are designed
to increase opportunities for disabled individuals in the workplace and in gaining education.
Social Security Disability Insurance
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is the largest Federal program that provides
assistance to disabled individuals. Administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA)
and passed in 1956, this safety net program provides cash assistance to people with disabilities
that render them unable to work. A person is considered disabled if he has a physical or
mental condition that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity and the
condition is expected to last at least 12 months or result in death. The definition of disability
is somewhat subjective, and the decision of disability status is made by a SSA employee. The
severity and type of the medical condition, whether the person is currently working, what the
person did before the disability, and if the person can do other types of work are all taken
into consideration. Further, to be eligible, people are generally required to have worked for a
certain amount of time. For example, a 42 year old must have five years of work experience
to qualify for benefits.
Individuals who qualify to receive benefits begin to receive them six months after the date
the SSA determines that the disability began. Benefits are calculated based on lifetime earn-
ings. After a two year waiting period, SSDI recipients are also eligible for Medicare. Individuals
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may receive these benefits as long as their medical condition does not improve and they are
unable to work. SSDI recipients are allowed to work, as long as their earnings are below the
level of substantial gainful activity, which is set at $1,000 per month for 2010.1
Supplemental Security Insurance
Like SSDI, the Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI) program is a federal safety net pro-
gram that provides benefits for disabled people, among other groups. Unlike SSDI, for which
individuals qualify based on their medical condition in relationship to work, SSI considers not
only one’s disability status but also his financial needs as measured by income and assets.
Earned income, unearned income, in-kind transfers, and deemed (i.e. spousal) income are all
considered, and generally higher income levels mean lower (or no) SSI benefits. There is also
a resource limit of $2,000 per individual that includes holdings in cash, a bank account, land,
vehicles, and other personal property. The maximum SSI payment for 2010 is $674, and the
earnings limit for wages is $1,433. Social Security Insurance recipients are also immediately
eligible for Medicaid.
Ticket to Work
Being unable to work is a criteria for receipt of SSDI and (some) SSI benefits, and the
Ticket to Work program establishes a mechanism to help disabled workers return to work.
Ticket to Work organizes systems of Employer Networks, which consist of employers willing
to hire SSDI and SSI recipients, and vocational rehabilitation and other support services. The
stated goal is to increase opportunities and choices which help disabled beneficiaries find, en-
ter, and retain employment.
The Americans With Disabilities Act
Passed in 1990 and enacted in 1992, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a land-
mark civil rights policy aimed at protecting individuals with disabilities. The policy grants
1The SGA limit for blind SSDI recipients is set higher, at $1,640 per month.
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access to and protection against discrimination in the realms of employment, public trans-
portation, public accommodations, and telecommunications. According to this legislation, a
person is considered to have a disability if he or she “has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or
is regarded as having such an impairment.”
The employment component of the ADA aims to reduce discrimination in employment,
including hiring, firing, promotion, training, terms of employment, and compensation against
disabled individuals who are qualified for a given position. An important aspect of the em-
ployment section states that employers must provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled
employee. This applies to employers with 15 or more employees, as long as it does not provide
undue hardship on the firm, which is defined as “an action requiring significant difficulty or ex-
pense”. Accommodations may take many forms, such as modifying the individual’s workspace
and equipment, providing flexible work hours, or providing an interpreter.
Any violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act may be brought to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The first full year the ADA was in effect, 1993,
15,274 cases were reported to the EEOC. Almost two decades after the passing of the legisla-
tion, in 2009, 21,451 cases were brought to the EEOC, resulting in $67.8 million of awards.2
Unfortunately, this is evidence that discrimination against disabled individuals in the work-
place still occurs today.
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of 1990 provides equal educational
opportunities to disabled children from birth up to age 21.3 IDEA provides federal funding for
states who provide appropriate early intervention, special education, and related services to
disabled youth. Not all disabilities are covered, however, as the legislation specifically covers
those with sensory limitations, orthopedic impairments, speech impairments, autism, mental
2http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm
3For more, see http://idea.ed.gov.
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retardation, traumatic brain injury, and emotional problems.
Under IDEA, disabled youth are provided with individualized education programs to suit
their needs and a team of support at school. Transportation, rehabilitation, and psychological
services may all be provided as well, if deemed necessary. The major goals of this legislation
are for children to receive appropriate special education services and be prepared for further
education, employment, and independent living.
2.3 Related Literature
The majority of empirical research on disability has focused on the decision to remain
employed or exit the labor force. There is less known about the employment-related outcomes
of disabled workers who remain employed. Although a disability may render an individual
unable to remain in his current job, that person may adapt to his new set of abilities by
changing occupations or employers as opposed to discontinuing employment.
A few studies have explored the role of health on employer or occupational transitions
among older workers. Daly and Bound (1996) analyze the characteristics that contribute
to employer change for disabled workers using the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).
The authors find that age has a negative impact on the likelihood of employer change and
that disabled workers who change employers have a larger decrease in physical job demands
compared to those who remain with their current employer. Bound et al. (1999) and Blau and
Gilleskie (2001) analyze the dynamic effects of impairment on labor market withdrawal and
job change of older workers using the first three waves of the HRS. These papers are some of
the only studies in this area to explicitly model disability, controlling for the endogeneity of
the variable. Bound et al. (1999) find that a transition from good to poor health has a positive
effect on the probability of changing jobs between nine and fourteen percentage points. Blau
and Gilleskie (2001) find that transitions from excellent to poor health and from non-disabled to
disabled have small negative impacts on the probability of changing jobs. Pelkowski and Berger
(2003) extend employment transition analysis to include occupational change, although only
consider occupational changes in conjunction with employer change. Their model is dynamic
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in that they consider the timing of health onset relative to employment spells. The study finds
that workers with health problems are 15 percentage points less likely to change employer, but
those who do are more likely to also have large occupational changes.
Even fewer researchers have analyzed the role of health on employer and occupational tran-
sitions of younger workers. Baldwin and Schumacher (2002) use the SIPP to study voluntary
and involuntary employer changes over a 20-month period of disabled persons 16 to 65 years
old. Considering a survey responder who has changed employers at any point during this
period a “changer”, they find that disabled workers are 2.7 percent more likely to have an
involuntary job change, but no more or less likely to have a voluntary job change. Differenc-
ing the wage between the start and end of the survey, the authors also find that involuntary
changes have almost no impact on wages for disabled workers but voluntary changes have a
negative impact. Campolieti (2009) uses the Participation and Activity Limitation Survey
(PALS) from Canada to study the employer changes of disabled workers across a four-month
span. His goal is to identify characteristics that influence the decision to change employers or
exit employment relative to remaining with an employer. He finds that, compared to a worker
with a mild disability, men with moderate and severe disabilities are respectively 9.1 and 6.9
percentage points more likely to change employers. No comparison is made to non-disabled
workers as they are not included in the survey. Campolieti and Krashinsky (2006) analyze the
role of employer change on wages of permanently disabled Canadian workers over a one-year
period. They find that the disabled workers who return to their pre-injury employer earn over
27 percent more than those who change employers. Each of these three studies treat disability
as exogenous and thus may misestimate of the impact of disability if unobservables influence
both disability and employment outcomes.
As occupational and employer transitions may be likely forms of adjustment to disability,
several papers attempt to learn more information about the role of disability in determining
job characteristics. The previously mentioned Daly and Bound (1996) study specifically looks
at the role of job characteristics on labor market outcomes for those with a disability. The
authors examine whether workers or employers adjust to the onset of a work impairment
by changing job characteristics and/or other forms of explicit accommodation. The study
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identifies the aforementioned trends in their sample of disabled near-retirees and finds that
men who change employers reduce the degree of physical job characteristics required, but
also were in more physically challenging jobs to begin with. The authors also find that none
of the occupational characteristics - physical demand, pace set by others, mental demand,
and dealing with people - have a significant effect on the decision to exit the labor force,
change employers, or remain with an employer. An early study by Chirikos and Nestel (1981)
explores the effect of health on a variety of labor market outcomes of men aged 55 - 69.
Constructing an index of limitations to measure health, the authors find that an interaction
between impairment and job type is not significant in determining labor force participation.
Although the interaction between limitations and jobs are not significant, the analysis does
reveal that impaired workers in physical jobs, jobs that involve walking-standing, and jobs
that involve sitting-hand/eye coordination, have significantly higher hours worked.
Job characteristics may also, in turn, affect disability status. Cropper (1977) develops a
theoretical model of occupational choice as an investment in health. Individuals face a tradeoff
between employment at a high paying and high risk job and at a lower paying but safe job.
Working in the high risk job increases the probability of illness and also of death. The solution
to the model yields that young and old workers will find it optimal to work at the high risk
job, but middle aged workers will seek employment in the safe job. The implications of the
model are not tested with data, but the paper lays the foundation for considering occupational
choice as an investment in health stock. Kemna (1987) develops a basic theoretical model
and empirically examines the impact of job characteristics on self reported health. The job
characteristics he examines are hazards including if a job is physically strenuous, repetitious,
or involves extreme environmental conditions. His findings suggest that being employed in a
job with one of these conditions decreases the health of an individual. This effect is magnified
for those employed in the occupation for five years or longer, but is smaller if an individual is
employed for ten or more years.
Several papers have estimated the direct impact of disability on wages. Using similar
approaches, Charles (2003), Mok et al. (2006), Meyer and Mok (2008) find that disability
has a persistent negative impact on wages that is worse for chronic and severe disabilities.
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After controlling for industry and occupation, Charles (2003) finds that the effect of disability
on wages is reduced and notes that “almost half of the recovery men are estimated to make
in the two years after onset seems to be the result of changes in industry and occupation.”
Examining the wage gap between disabled and non-disabled workers in the years 1972-1984,
Baldwin and Johnson (1994) control for experience and tenure, and find that both variables
have a positive impact on wages. Contrary to expectations, the disabled workers analyzed
have more experience and tenure than non-disabled men, which helps decrease the wage gap
between the two groups. In a more recent study, DeLeire (2001) analyzes the wage gap from
1984-1993. In DeLeire’s sample, disabled workers also have higher amounts of employer tenure
than the non-disabled, but he does not find that tenure is a significant component of the wage
gap.
I contribute to the literature on disability and employment in several ways. First, this
research captures more potential employment transitions than previous research which has
spanned at most three waves. The data utilized in this study follows individuals for twelve
waves with interviews every four months. Second, this is the only study (to my knowledge)
to examine the role of disability on both employer and occupational change. That is, I model
individuals who change only their occupation, who change only their employer, and who change
both occupations and employers.4 In addition to estimating employment transitions, I also
model occupational choice, and in doing so address the fact that occupational characteristics
are likely endogenous. Third, I model disability jointly with employment outcomes and wages.
I account for both length of disability and severity of disability which is absent from many other
related papers. I also measure the degree to which occupational characteristics affect disability
status. Finally, the dynamic modeling strategy allows me to measure the the direct impact of
disability on wages as well as the indirect effect of disability on wages through employer and
occupational tenure.
4In any one wave of the SIPP data, 5.3 - 13.8 percent of workers change only occupations, 3.1 - 4.1 percent
change only employers, and 0.3 - 0.9 percent change occupations and employers. These percentages also vary
by disability status.
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Chapter 3
Conceptual Framework
The theoretical model presented in this section motivates the empirical specification that
follows. The purpose of the model is to illustrate how disability may affect the likelihood that a
worker changes his occupation or employer and, more generally, how disabled workers choose
occupations. The model further describes how such employment outcomes affect disability
status and wages (through occupational and employer tenure). The focus of this research and
the theoretical model is on workers who are employed.
3.1 Employment Transitions
The first goal of the current research is to establish whether or not observed occupational
and employer tenure provide an indirect avenue through which disability affects earnings, while
controlling for the endogeneity of these transitions. I will begin by outlining a model in which
a previously employed individual may continue to work in the same occupation with the same
employer, become jobless, change employers and/or change occupations.
The interplay of disability, job mobility, and wages is modeled in a dynamic framework
with the following timing assumptions:
1. The individual enters the period knowing his disability status and his disability and
employment histories.
2. Four job offers are received each period: an offer from his current job, one from a
new occupation, one from a new employer, and one from a new occupation with a new
employer.
3. Based on this information, the individual then simultaneously chooses whether or not to
work, his occupation, and his employer. Wages of those who work are observed by the
researcher.
4. At the end of the period the individual’s disability status evolves.
Individuals receive utility in period t from consumption (Ct) and leisure (Lt). The marginal
utility of leisure (or disutility of working) varies with disability status (Dt). All else equal, the
presence of a disability will likely increase the disutility of working. The amount of disutil-
ity caused by a disability depends not only on the nature of the disability, but also on tasks
required by the job, and special accommodations made by the employer. Accordingly, the
same disability may bring different levels of disutility to identical workers depending on job
components (Jt) which include employer and occupational characteristics. Variables that shift
preferences also affect utility. These include observable individual characteristics (Xt) and un-
observable permanent (µ), time varying (νt), and idiosyncratic (t) characteristics. Specifically,
lifetime utility is represented by:
Et
[
T∑
t=1
βtUt(Ct, Lt;Dt, Jt, Xt, µ, νt, t)
]
where Et[ ] is the expectations operator and β is the discount factor. The individual subscript,
i, is dropped for notational ease.
Hours in a period (Ω) are divided between hours of work (Ht) and leisure (Lt):
Ω = Ht + Lt.
Total consumption (Ct) is the sum of earned income and unearned income (Yt).1 Earned
income is the product of hourly wages (Wt) and hours worked. The budget constraint is given
by:
Ct = Wt ∗Ht + Yt.
1In order to focus on the employment decision, the model abstracts from specific consumption decisions that
may depend on disability status, such as medical care consumption or transportation costs.
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Substituting the budget and time constraints in to the per period utility function, we have:
Ut(Wt ∗Ht + Yt,Ω−Ht;Dt, Jt, Xt, µ, νt, t).
At the beginning of each period an employed individual receives four job offers: a job
with his current occupation and employer, a new occupation with his current employer, a new
employer in his current occupation, and a new occupation with a new employer. An individual
who was not employed in the previous period only has two options: non-employment and
employment. These offers specify wages (Wt), and job components (Jt) including hours of
work, occupational characteristics, and employer characteristics.
The wage is determined by individual attributes, job components, and market character-
istics. An individual’s demographic characteristics (Xt) and disability status entering period
t (Dt) affect wages. Disability directly affects wages through productivity differences and/or
discriminatory practices, although these explanations are indistinguishable (and unexplored)
in this model. An individual’s firm specific and skill specific expertise may also affect wages.
This experience is captured by the individual’s employer tenure (ETt) and occupational tenure
(OTt) up to period t.2 Job components of the period t alternative (Jt) include hours of work,
job characteristics, and employer characteristics. Wages are also affected by local labor market
conditions (Zt). Finally, unobserved permanent (µ) and time-varying characteristics (νt) and
an idiosyncratic wage shock (Wt ) influence wages. Wages can be described as:
Wt(Dt, OTt, ETt, Jt, Xt, Zt, µ, νt, Wt ). (3.1)
where occupational and employer tenure are determined by the history of occupation and
employer transitions.
In each period a worker may remain with his current job (which carries with it job com-
ponents, an hourly wage, and hours of employment), change occupations or employers (which
2Note that the measure considered here is tenure, not total work experience.
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implies different job components but erases occupational or employer tenure), or become non-
employed. The observed employment outcome is a function of individual attributes, disability
status, job components, market conditions, and unearned income (Yt). Large sums of unearned
income lead to a low marginal utility of consumption and thus a higher reservation wage. In-
dividuals with high reservation wages are less likely to work, implying that unearned income
should have a negative effect on the likelihood of being employed. Employment alternatives
are also affected by unobserved characteristics and preferences (µ and νt).
Defining all state variables as St and allowing disability status to take on a value d ∈ [0, D],
the value function for an individual choosing employment alternative r can be defined as:
Vr(St, t) = Ut(W rt ∗Hrt + Yt,Ω−Hrt ; d, Jrt , Xt, µ, νt) + rt + β[
D∑
d=0
P (Dt+1 = d)V (St+1)].
The maximal expected value of lifetime utility is:
V (St) = Et−1[ max
q=1,...,R
Vq(St, t)] ∀ t.
The optimal employment alternative is given by:
Rt(Dt, OTt, ETt, Jt, Xt, Yt, Zt, µ, νt, t). (3.2)
Disability status evolves at the end of the period. Disability depends on observable and
unobservable individual characteristics and current disability status.3 Employment status
and job components also affect one’s disability status, as job tasks may have a direct effect
on health. The length of time a person has been performing job tasks or in a given work
environment, as captured by occupational and employer tenure, also influence disability status.
Unearned income may also influence one’s health, as individuals with high income may be able
to purchase more preventative and curative medicine than low income individuals. Specifically,
3Section 2.1 provides an in-depth discussion of the sources of endogeneity.
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disability in period t+ 1 is described as:
Dt+1(Dt, OTt+1, ETt+1, Jt+1, Xt, Yt, µ, νt, Dt ). (3.3)
Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) above provide the basis for the empirical model of the first
set of analyses that is described in the following section.
3.2 Occupational Characteristics
The second research goal is to understand the interplay between occupational characteris-
tics and disability. In this section, I will elaborate on the above theoretical model to account
for occupational choice and the impact of occupational characteristics on disability.
Again, assume that a previously employed individual may become jobless or choose between
many different occupations. Per period utility is a function of consumption (Ct), leisure (Lt),
disability status (Dt), job components (Jt), observable individual characteristics (Xt) and
unobservable permanent (µ), time varying (νt), and idiosyncratic (t) characteristics:
Ut(Ct, Lt;Dt, Jt, Xt, µ, νt, t).
Job components are comprised of employer and occupational characteristics; the focus here is
on the later. Occupational characteristics describe the nature of work and specific tasks an
employee is required to perform. An individual may select a job based on the required tasks.
Specifically, a disabled individual may find that his health limitation makes a particular work
requirement uncomfortable to perform, and will choose an occupation that does not involve
that task. The tradeoff that a worker faces is that choosing a job with low skill requirements
may also come with a lower wage.
In addition to the direct utility received from shifting towards or away from certain occupa-
tional tasks, an individual may also benefit from selecting certain occupations if occupational
characteristics influence disability status. Recall, from Equation (3.1), that disability is a func-
tion of occupational characteristics, among other variables. For example, a person working in
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a warehouse is likely to do a lot of heavy lifting, which could lead to a back injury. On the
other hand, an occupation that has a lot of interpersonal interaction may have indirect health
benefits arising from having a support network. Individuals may then choose occupations with
the impact of the required tasks on health in mind.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Model
4.1 Empirical Specification
In this section, I describe the econometric framework motivated by the theoretical model
and used to analyze the data. The estimated equations are linear approximations to optimal
decisions that are explained by both observed (endogenous and exogenous) variables and un-
observed variables. Note that the employment transition and occupational choice models are
estimated separately.
4.1.1 Employment Transitions
The goal of this analysis is to determine the effect of disability on employment, occupa-
tional change, employer change, and observed wages. Based on the model of decision making
behavior, the employment outcomes of optimizing individuals are observed every period. These
employment outcomes (Rt) of those who were employed in the previous period are:
r =

0, non-employment
1, employment with a new employer in a new occupation
2, employment with a new employer in the same occupation
3, employment with the same employer in a new occupation
4, employment with the same employer in the same occupation.
An individual who enters the period non-employed faces alternatives Rt = r ∈ {0, 1} only.
In each period an employed individual chooses whether to remain employed and, if em-
ployed, whether to choose the same or a new occupation and employer. The theoretical model
implies that job components of each employment alternative influence this decision. How-
ever, because observational data generally provide job components of the chosen employment
option only, measurement of the impact of employer and occupational characteristics is com-
promised. Additionally, employer and occupational characteristics are endogenous. Disabled
workers may change employers or occupations to accommodate themselves to deteriorations in
health. These changes are likely not random as workers may systematically make employment
changes as a coping mechanism. Similarly, unobserved individual characteristics may influence
both disability and occupational or employer choice. As the focus of this section of the paper
is on disentangling the direct impact of disability on wages from the indirect effect captured
by occupational and employer tenure and in light of the endogeneity of occupational and em-
ployer choice, I do not include contemporaneous or lagged job components such as hours of
work, occupational characteristics, or employer characteristics in the employment equation.
The following subsection will address the endogeneity of occupational characteristics.
I model the per period employment outcomes indicated by Rt = r, which allows for the en-
dogenous determination of occupational and employer tenure. More specifically, conditional on
being employed in the previous period (Et−1 = 1), the probability of a particular employment
outcome in period t relative to non-employment (expressed in log odds) is given by:
ln
[
Pr(Rt = r|Et−1 = 1)
Pr(Rt = 0|Et−1 = 1)
]
= αr0+αr1SDt +αr2S
E
t +αr3Xt+αr4Yt+αr5Zt+µ
r
1+υ
r
1t, r=1,..,4.
(4.1)
The vector of variables describing one’s disability history entering period t, SDt , includes dis-
ability status, disability severity status, the number of periods since first disability onset if
the individual entered the sample disabled, and disability tenure if the individual entered the
sample without a disability. Employment history entering the period, SEt , is described by
the number of consecutive periods an individual has worked for the same employer (employer
tenure), the number of consecutive periods an individual has worked in the same occupation
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(occupational tenure), and the number of periods of recent non-employment (which will be
zero for those employed in period t − 1). The observed exogenous variables (Xt) include
age, race, marital status, number of children, educational attainment, urbanicity, and region.
Unearned income is measured as the amount of non-transfer income and is denoted Yt. Mar-
ket characteristics are contained in Zt, which includes the average local unemployment rate.1
Note that unobserved permanent and time-varying individual components affect all estimated
equations.2
A person who was nonemployed in period t − 1 has only two alternatives: to become
employed or remain jobless. Expressed in log odds, the probability of entering employment is:
ln
[
Pr(Et = 1|Et−1 = 0)
Pr(Et = 0|Et−1 = 0)
]
= β0 + β1SDt + β2S
E
t + β3Xt + β4Yt + β5Zt + µ2 + υ2t. (4.2)
Here, the relevant variable from the employment history vector (SEt ) is the length of time a
person has been jobless, as the occupational and employer tenure variables are zero.
The natural log of observed wages in period t, conditional on employment in period t is:
lnWt = δ0 + δ1SDt + δ2S
E
t+1 + δ3Xt + δ4Zt + µ3 + υ3t + 3t. (4.3)
The updated employment history (SEt+1) accounts for current employment choices and includes
hours worked, employer size, dummy variables for occupational category, employer and occu-
pational tenure.3 Note that observed wages are also explained by disability entering period t
and an interaction between disability status and each tenure variable.
Disability status evolves at the end of the period. Disability status is defined as three
1The average local unemployment rate is defined as the unemployment rate in a given area defined by the
SIPP, which is roughly a metropolitan statistical area.
2The joint distribution of the µs and the joint distribution of the υts will be discussed in Section 4.2.
3I acknowledge that hours worked, employer size, and occupation are likely endogenous. However, I take the
stance that the omitted variable bias caused by ignoring these variables may be worse than estimation including
these endogenous variables. As the effect of these variables is not the focus in this section of the paper, I include
them in estimation yet do not discuss their marginal effects. A more careful analyses of occupational choice is
conducted later in the dissertation.
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different levels: non-disabled, moderately disabled, and severely disabled (d = 0, 1, 2). Exoge-
nous individual characteristics, current disability status, the characteristics implied by current
period occupational and employment choices, unearned income, and unobserved individual
characteristics influence period t+ 1 disability.4 More specifically, in log odds, the probability
of a disability is given by:
ln
[
Pr(Dt+1 = d)
Pr(Dt+1 = 0)
]
= γd0 + γd1SDt + γd2S
E
t+1 + γd3Xt + γd4Yt + µ
d
4 + υ
d
4t, d = 1, 2. (4.4)
4.1.2 Occupational Characteristics
In this section, I focus on the empirical specifications used to determine how individuals
choose occupations. This model is similar to the model for employer transitions, except in-
stead of choosing which of the R = 5 transitions to make, here individuals choose among R
occupations:
r =

0, non-employment
1, employment in occupation 1
2, employment in occupation 2
...
R, employment in occupation R.
The theoretical model implies that the optimal outcome is the one that maximizes current
and future utility. The individual, then, is choosing between occupations, and the outcome
depends on both individual and occupational characteristics. To incorporate both sets of
variables, the probability of an unobserved occupational outcome is estimated as a mixed
4Refer to Footnote 3 above.
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conditional logit model.5 Empirically, occupational choice is estimated as:
ln
[
Pr(Rt = r)
Pr(Rt = 0)
]
= αr0 +αr1SDt +αr2S
E
t +α3Ort+αr4Xt+αr5Yt+αr6Zt+µ
r
1 +υ
r
1t, r=1,..,R.
(4.5)
In the above equation, the individual subscripts have been relaxed, for notational ease. Occu-
pational outcome is a function of several individual characteristics including disability history,
SDt , employment history, S
E
t , observed exogenous variables, Xt, unearned income, Yt, and
market characteristics, Zt. Occupational choice also depends on occupational characteristics,
Ort, which are occupation specific.
In estimating such a model, I have made the assumption that all occupations are available to
all individuals. This, of course, is unlikely to be completely accurate, as many occupations have
educational and training requirements that are not currently held by much of the population.
In future research, a mechanism in which the outcomes are weighted by the probability that
an outcome is available to each individual could strengthen the estimation method. Still, this
approach is an improvement over methods that assume that occupations are exogenous.
4.2 Estimation Technique
Discrete Factor Random Effects
Estimation of the empirical equations is performed using a nonlinear random effects esti-
mation technique, referred to as the Discrete Factor Random Effects method (DFRE). This
approach controls for variables that are unobservable to the researcher and may impact all
equations, as failure to control for these unobservables may result in biased estimates. The
DFRE method estimates the distribution of these unobserved variables by decomposing the
error term into three parts: permanent heterogeneity (µon), time-varying heterogeneity (υ
o
nt),
and random error term (ont). This decomposition is applied to all n estimated equations as
5Recall that multinomial logit models require that control variables be the same for all options. Thus,
individual characteristics are valid control variables. However, as occupations have characteristics that vary
across alternatives, these characteristics are not valid covariates for a mutinomial logit model. For more see
Appendix C.1.
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well as for each outcome o of multinomial logit equations. The random component of the error
is iid for continuous equations, and extreme value distributed for logit equations. Allowing the
unobserved heterogeneity to be non-linear, the error term for all equations may be written as:
ξont = µ
o
n + υ
o
nt + 
o
nt (4.6)
where µ and υt are assumed to be correlated across equations while t is random and uncor-
related.6
The cumulative distribution function of each unobserved heterogeneity component is ap-
proximated by a discrete stepwise function. The function is estimated with points of support
for the distribution of unobserved factors.7 This flexible estimation technique does not impose
joint normality on the error terms as is standard in many maximum likelihood techniques
(Heckman and Singer (1984)). Using a Monte Carlo simulation, Mroz (1999) shows that when
the true distribution of the error terms is jointly normal the Discrete Factor Random Effects
method performs as well as maximum likelihood estimation. However, when the distribution
is not normal, the DFRE method performs better in terms of precision and bias.
This approach offers many benefits over the fixed-effects method, which is commonly used
with panel data to control for permanent individual unobservables over time. While fixed
effects account for permanent individual heterogeneity only, I specify discrete approximations
to both permanent and time-varying unobserved individual heterogeneity using the DFRE
method. Additionally, the use of fixed effects to capture permanent unobservables would not
allow for measurement of the effect of observable non-time varying variables on wages. Lastly,
while both methods introduce additional estimated parameters, the discrete distributions of
the random effects add only a fraction of the additional parameters required by the fixed effects
method.
6Time-varying heterogeneity is not serially correlated. However, to the extent that a time-varying shock
effects a contemporaneous variable and that variable effects future values, the effect of the shock will be fully
absorbed in observable characteristics.
7For more details, see Appendix C.2.
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Initial Conditions and Attrition
Accompanying the many benefits of longitudinal data on individuals is the restriction
that behavior is observed for a subset of the individuals’ decision making periods. More
specifically, individuals enter the research sample with non-zero values of the endogenous
employment and disability history variables. Accordingly, the equations outlined above that
utilize lagged information cannot be estimated for the first period of the survey. These “pre-
sample” decisions are likely correlated with unobserved permanent individual characteristics
that also influence observed (“within sample”) outcomes. To account for this correlation,
I model the initial state variables as reduced form equations using only contemporaneous
variables that also depend on permanent unobserved heterogeneity. I estimate equations for
initial employer tenure, occupational tenure, and disability status jointly with the per-period
equations for employment outcomes, wages, and disability status.
Observations on individuals in the research sample are also right censored; individuals attrit
from the sample each period. In order to account for the potential of non-random attrition, I
estimate the probability of attriting as a function of observed behavior as well as permanent
and time-varying unobservables. This attrition equation is jointly estimated with the other
equations in the model.
Identification
In a dynamic model with many outcomes, we have to be concerned about properly iden-
tifying effects of interest. In particular, we need to measure the causal effect of occupation
and employer tenure on wages and the casual effect of employment outcomes on disability.
Identification requires that a variable explain observed employment outcomes that has no in-
dependent effect on wages or on disability conditional on the outcome. The theoretical model
implies that unearned income affects choice of employment alternative but does not impact
wages. Similarly, average unemployment rates, which affect employment alternatives, are ex-
cluded from the disability equation. Both variables are significant in the equations modeled,
and a likelihood ratio test of joint significance produces a p-value of 0.001. Further, the vari-
ables are jointly insignificant in the equations from which they are excluded, supporting the
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validity of the instruments.
The effect of disability on employment outcomes must also be properly identified. Disability
status entering period t is shifted by previous per period variables, some exogenous and some
endogenous. The endogenous variables (such as employment outcomes in the previous period)
are functions of exogenous variables (such as average unemployment rates). Therefore, the
entire history of exogenous variables provides exogenous variation and identifies the causal
effect of disability on employment outcomes (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
Initial disability status is identified by indicators for whether one served in the Vietnam
War and whether one served in any other major military conflict. These variables influence
initial disability status, but do not affect subsequent disability probabilities conditional on
disability entering the period. Initial occupational tenure and initial employer tenure are both
identified by the unemployment rate at the time an individual graduated from his highest
level of education. These variables do not affect subsequent employment outcomes but are
significant in the initial occupational tenure and employer tenure equations.
4.3 Likelihood Function
For the model of employment transitions and wages, an individual’s contribution to the
likelihood function, unconditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, is:
Li(θ, ρ, ψ) =
K∑
k=1
ρk
{
6∏
e=0
P(ET1 = e|µe6k)1[ETi1 = e]
6∏
o=0
P(OT1 = o|µo7k)1[OTi1 = o]
2∏
d=0
P(Dt+1 = d|µd5k, υd5t`)1[Dit+1 = d]
T∏
t=1
L∑
`=1
ψ`
[ R∏
r=0
P(Rt = r|µr1k, υr1t`)1[Rit = r]1[Eit−1 = 1]
P(Et = 1|µ2k, υ2t`)Eit [1− P(Et = 1|µ2k, υ2t`)]1−Eit1[Eit−1 = 0]
[
1
σ
Φ(lnWt|µ3k, υ3t`)]Eit
2∏
d=0
P(Dt+1 = d|µd4k, υd4t`)1[Dit+1 = d]
]}
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where θ denotes the parameters that are estimated in the model. ρk is the estimated joint
probability of the kth permanent mass point, which is given by:
ρk = P(µ01 = µ
0
1k, ..., µ
4
1 = µ
4
1k, µ2 = µ2k, µ3 = µ3k, µ
0
4 = µ
0
4k, .., µ
2
4 = µ
2
4k,
µ05 = µ
0
5k, ..., µ
2
5 = µ
2
5k, µ
0
6 = µ
0
6k, ..., µ
6
6 = µ
6
6k, µ
0
7 = µ
0
7k, ..., µ
6
7 = µ
6
7k).
ψ` is the estimated joint probability of the `th time-varying mass point and is given by:
ψ` = P(υ01 = υ
0
1`, ..., υ
4
1 = υ
4
1`, υ2 = υ2`, υ3 = υ3`, υ
0
4 = υ
0
4`, ..., υ
2
4 = υ
2
4`).
Time-varying heterogeneity is excluded from the initial period equations.
The likelihood function described is the basis for the maximum likelihood random effects
estimation technique used to analyze the data. The data used in the analysis is described in
the following section.
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Chapter 5
Data
5.1 Individual-Level Data
The data used to estimate the model come from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP). Although the SIPP has been conducted as recently as 2004,
I have chosen to use the 1996 panel because it runs for four years, and is the longest running
of all panels. The 1996 panel also has the most sample members of all SIPP panels.
The SIPP provides detailed longitudinal information on income amounts and sources as
well as the participation in and eligibility for federal, state, and local government programs.
Although the SIPP does not directly focus on disability or employment, much information on
these topics is provided. The SIPP interviews participants every four months instead of every
year as is standard in many surveys.1 This structure makes the SIPP particularly appealing
to study disability and employment, as these outcomes may fluctuate several times within a
year and may be subject to recall bias if survey intervals are long.2
The focus of my analysis is on the employment behavior of males during their prime working
years as it relates to disability. Accordingly, the research sample includes men over the age of
1At every interview, respondents are asked to report current information as well as recall certain information
from each of the past three months. For example, a person interviewed in April, would also be asked about
information in January, February, March, and April. Unfortunately, respondents are only asked to recall
disability status, employer, and occupation for the current month. Accordingly, I am unable to exploit all
information available in the SIPP and only analyze the data from every fourth month.
2Blau (1994) finds that yearly data sets underestimate employment transitions among near-retirement aged
men compared to quarterly data.
Table 5.1: Sample Determination
Criterion Individuals
Male Survey Respondent 56,003
Aged 25 to 60 26,253
Six Consecutive Periods 14,963
25 (inclusive) and less than 60 (exclusive). I retain individuals with information on disability,
employment, occupation, and hours worked for at least six consecutive periods (two years). Of
the 56,003 men surveyed, 26,253 were between the ages of 25 and 60. Of those, 11,290 did not
have six or more consecutive periods of information and were dropped. The research sample
consists of 14,963 individuals and 155,045 person-wave observations. The details of the sample
determination are contained in Table 5.1.
It should be the case that those excluded due to missing variables are similar to the research
sample, and the two groups are compared in Table 5.2. For my research sample, the averages
are calculated based on the periods that the individual would be used in analysis, i.e. a
consecutive sequence. Thus each individual could contribute anywhere between six and twelve
periods worth of information, and the number of periods of information contributed can also
vary by variable. The averages for the individuals that are dropped from my sample due to
missing values are calculated based on all periods of available information. The two samples
are similar across many dimensions, with the exception of marital status. The 13 percentage
point difference in the incidence of marriage between the two groups is likely attributed to
sample design. The SIPP surveys by households, so if a person is unmarried he is more likely
to have entered the household after they survey has begun or to leave the household and thus
not be included in the sample. However, the research sample is not statistically different from
the excluded sample in terms of two of the variables of focus: disability status and employment.
One of the main goals of the analysis is to measure the dynamic impact of disability
on employment outcomes. Figure 5.1 illustrates how employment rates change over time as
disability evolves. The horizontal axis, disability tenure, represents the number of periods
before or after the onset of a disability (denoted as a disability tenure of 0) for disability
spells that begin in the survey. If a person is disabled, recovers, and becomes disabled again
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Table 5.2: Comparison of The Research Sample to Persons Dropped Due to Missing Variables
Variable Research Sample Dropped Sample Difference
Age 41.3 39.9 1.39
(9.3) (9.9)
Non-White 0.15 0.17 -0.02
(0.36) (0.37)
Education 13.2 13.0 0.24
(3.0) (2.8)
Married 0.69 0.55 0.13
(0.45) (0.49)
Non-Metropolitan 0.20 0.18 -0.02
(0.39) (0.37)
Disabled 0.11 0.11 -0.00
(0.27) (0.28)
Employed 0.88 0.87 -0.01
(0.28) (0.30)
N 14,964 11,289
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
he is considered to be in a new spell of disability and his tenure would restart at zero upon
the beginning of the second disability spell. The graph shows that the employment rate is
relatively stable prior to the onset of disability and plunges and remains low once disability
occurs.3
Individuals with disabilities differ not only by length of time disabled but also by the
severity of their disability. Separating the disabled into two groups, Figure 5.2 shows changes
in employment by length of disability for the moderately disabled and the severely disabled.
The progression of employment rates differs vastly across these two groups and it appears that
it is the severely disabled who are driving the drop in employment rates among the disabled.
The non-disabled, the moderately disabled, and the severely disabled differ by exogenous
characteristics. Table 5.3 displays summary statistics separately for each group. Of the 14,963
individuals in the research sample, 3,068 (20 percent) are disabled at some point during the four
year period, with variation in the length of disability. These 3,068 individuals contribute 16,479
3Note that the sample composition is considerably smaller (and potentially different) the longer the number
of quarters before or after onset. That is, the employment rates in the left and right tails of the figure are
weighted towards more and less healthy individuals, respectively.
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Figure 5.1: Employment Rate by Disability Tenure
Figure 5.2: Employment Rate by Disability Tenure and Severity
Moderately Disabled Severely Disabled
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Table 5.3: Comparison of the Non-Disabled to the Disabled
Variable Non-Disabled Moderately Severely
Disabled Disabled
Age (in years) 40.99 (9.07) 43.70 (9.07) 46.24 (8.87)
Non-White 0.14 (0.34) 0.14 (0.34) 0.26 (0.44)
Years of Education 13.46 (2.87) 12.40 (2.97) 10.62 (3.55)
Married 0.72 (0.45) 0.59 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50)
Non-Metropolitan Residence 0.20 (0.40) 0.25 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45)
Employed 0.95 (0.22) 0.89 (0.31) 0.04 (0.19)
Observations (person-wave) 138,566 6,208 10,271
Note: Standard Deviations in Parentheses.
Table 5.4: Comparison of the Employed Non-Disabled to the Employed Disabled
Variable Non-Disabled Moderately Severely
Disabled Disabled
Employedt−1
No Change (%) 87.83 (32.69) 79.06 (40.73) 29.66 (45.74)
Become Jobless (%) 1.41 (11.78) 4.97 (21.74) 58.10 (49.41)
Switch Occupation (%) 6.74 (25.08) 8.38 (27.71) 8.56 (28.02)
Switch Employer (%) 3.51 (18.39) 6.62 (24.86) 2.45 (15.47)
Switch Occupation and Employer (%) 0.51 (7.11) 1.03 (10.10) 1.22 (11.01)
Observations (person-wave) 119,026 5,049 327
Non-Employedt−1
Remain Jobless (%) 74.29 (43.70) 76.74 (42.28) 96.72 (17.82)
Become Employed (%) 25.71 (43.70) 23.26 (42.28) 3.28 (17.82)
Observations (person-wave) 6,232 589 8,859
Wage (1996 $) 10.74 (13.39) 7.42 (15.51) 5.75 (8.74)
Observations (person-wave) 118,952 4,935 428
Note: Standard Deviations in Parentheses.
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periods of disability to the person-wave observations. The disabled are older, less educated,
less likely to be married and live outside of metropolitan areas. While the moderately disabled
are slightly less likely to be employed than the non-disabled, very few of the severely disabled
work.
Table 5.4 reveals that labor market transitions vary across disability status. Non-disabled
and moderately disabled individuals who were employed in the previous period are unlikely
to become jobless in the current period, but over half of severely disabled workers become
jobless. Over 8.3 percent of workers with any level of disability change occupations compared
to 6.7 percent of non-disabled workers. Moderately disabled workers as a group are the most
likely to change employers. Conversely, severely disabled workers are the group least likely to
change employers. Moderate and severely disabled workers are also twice as likely to change
occupations and employers as are non-disabled workers. Non-disabled and moderately disabled
individuals who were not employed in the previous period are over seven times more likely to
gain employment than severely disabled workers. Of individuals who are employed, wages
decrease with disability severity. Non-disabled workers have an average wage of $10.74 an
hour, non-severely disabled workers earn $7.42 an hour, and the severely disabled make just
$5.75 an hour.4 This research examines the extent to which reductions in tenure associated
with job transitions contribute to this wage gap.
Disability is a heterogeneous concept, and there are likely many differences among disabled
individuals beyond chronicity and severity. One key difference between survey respondents
with a disability is the nature of the disability, as the SIPP specifically asks if the individual
has a physical or mental condition. Unfortunately, the source of disability is not asked in
every interview wave. Of the twelve interviews, this follow up question is only asked in waves
two, five, and eleven. The disability sources are listed in Table 5.5, and I have assigned each
condition as either a physical or mental limitation. Due to the large number of individuals for
whom this information is missing, I am unable to utilize this information in my estimation.
However, to understand the sample population, I have presented a description of the disability
4The minimum wages for the years 1996-2000 (in 1996 dollars) are: $4.75, $5.03, $4.96, $4.85, $4.69.
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source in Table 5.6. All estimates in the table are a pooled cross section across each of these
three waves of individuals who attribute their disability source.5
Table 5.6 confirms that there are distinct differences between those with physical and those
with mental disabilities. Although individuals with a mental disability are younger, on average
the group is less likely to be married, white, or live in a metropolitan area, and has a lower
education level. Individuals with a mental disability are also more likely to be severely disabled
with a chronic disability compared to those with a physical disability. The groups also differ
by employment status, as those with a mental disability are less likely to be employed and
work lower hours when they are employed. Physically and mentally disabled individuals differ
across a number of observed variables, and these observed differences will be accounted for in
estimation.
5In each cross section, approximately 10 percent of disabled individuals report their disability as “other”.
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Table 5.5: Definition of Disability Source
Physical Mental
AIDS Alcohol Problem
Arthritis Drug Problem
Back Problem Learning Disability
Blindness Mental/Emotional Problem
Broken Bone Mental Retardation
Cancer Senility/Dementia
Cerebral Palsy Alzheimer’s
Deafness Speech Disorder
Epilepsy
Head/Spine Injury
Heart Trouble
Hernia
High Blood Pressure
Kidney Stones
Lung/Respiratory Trouble
Missing Limb
Paralysis
Stiffness/Deformity of Limb
Stomach Trouble
Stroke
Thyroid Trouble
Tumor/Cyst
Table 5.6: Physical vs Mental
Variable Physical Mental
Age 45.3 41.3
Non-White (%) 24.0 17.0
Married (%) 61.8 29.6
Education (Years) 13.1 11.5
Non-Metropolitan (%) 26.0 28.6
Severely Disabled 41.3 71.0
Total Time Disabled (Years) 13.9 21.5
Employed (%) 66.2 26.1
Hours Worked if Employed 41.6 31.2
Person-Observations 7,495 1,417
Percent 84.1% 15.9%
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Table 5.7: Definition of Dependent and Key Explanatory Variables
Variable Description
Dependent Variables
Disabled Indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports having
a work limitation
Severely Disabled Indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports having
a work limitation that is severe enough to prevent work
Employed Indicator equal to 1 if employed
Wage Hourly wage calculated as weekly earnings divided by weekly
hours worked
Employment Transition
No Transition Remains with the same occupation and same employer
Become Jobless Not employed
Change Occupation Work with a new occupation and the same employer
Change Employers Work with the same occupation and a new employer
Change Both Work with a new occupation and a new employer
Occupational Choice 50 choice variable representing the 50 observed occupations
Key Explanatory Variables
Time Disabled Length of time (in years) the individual has been in a spell
of disability that began in the survey
Total Time Disabled Length of time (in years) since the individual reported his
first spell of disability
Occupational Tenure Length of time the individual has been continuously employed
in his current occupation
Employer Tenure Length of time the individual has been continuously employed
with his current employer
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5.2 Occupational Data
In addition to the SIPP data, I also use the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The
DOT is a comprehensive listing of thousands of jobs and the skills and tasks required in each
job. It was originally intended to be a guide to occupational placement, but has been used
in several economic studies as data sets (see Gronberg and Reed (1994), Smith et al. (1997),
Autor et. al (2003), or Wolff (2003)). I use the occupational code and definition trailer of each
occupation, which assign scores to eight job characteristics.
The last update to the DOT was made in 1991. Although I am using the SIPP between
1996 and 2000, the 1991 version of the DOT is sufficient in that there are no newly created
occupations in the SIPP that are not defined by the DOT. Since 1999, the DOT has been
succeeded by the Occupation Information Network (O*Net). O*Net is much more detailed
than the DOT which is helpful for career placement (but is nearly impossible to be viewed
as a concise data set). O*Net does not have a uniform listing of characteristics on which it
ranks all occupations. Instead each occupation is ranked on ten main categories, each of which
have subcategories listing the importance of narrowly defined tasks. Some of the categories
have over 50 sub-categories indicating the importance of each subcategory to the job. The
subcategories can vary across occupation: for example, a professional athlete and a chemist
may have very few of the same subcategories. Thus, O*Net has hundreds of tasks, which would
be prohibitively difficult to analyze and interpret in an economic study.
The occupation codes used in the SIPP are the 1990 Census codes. There are just over
500 census codes, and using a crosswalk provided by the National Crosswalk Center this
translates to over 12,000 DOT codes. Accordingly, each SIPP occupation may have multiple
DOT occupations codes. To assign one set of characteristics to each SIPP occupation code,
the median of the characteristics for each DOT code was used. If the median occurred between
two numbers, I assigned the more difficult value to the SIPP code.
The eight job characteristics I analyze are the degree to which a worker in a given oc-
cupation works with data, people, and things (inanimate objects), the amount of general
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educational development needed in reasoning, mathematics, and language, the amount of spe-
cific vocational preparation (SVP) required, as well as the strength requirement.6 For example,
the data category ranges from the least intensive score of one (which involves, in this case,
comparing data) up to seven (which involves synthesizing data). The range of all occupational
characteristics can be seen in Table 5.8. Examples of occupations by characteristics levels are
contained in Table 5.9.
Table 5.8: Definition of Job Characteristics
Variable Minimum Maximum
Data 1 Comparing 7 Synthesizing
People 1 Helping 9 Mentoring
Things 1 Handling 8 Setting Up
Reasoning 1 Commonsense 6 Conceptual
Math 1 Arithmetic 6 Advanced Calculus/Statistics
Language 1 Word Recognition, Sentences 6 Read/Write Literature, Critique
SVP 1 Short Demonstration 8 4-10 years
Strength 1 Sedentary 5 Heavy Work
Workers are found to choose jobs differently by disability status. The distribution of char-
acteristics by disability status can be found in Figure 5.3. The figure reveals that disabled
workers have lower levels of work with data, people, reasoning, math, language, and training
time than non-disabled workers. However, disabled workers do not appear to be significantly
different from non-disabled workers in regards to working with things, and have higher strength
6DOT rankings have been shifted so that 0 represents a low requirement level, and higher values indicate
increased requirements in that category.
Table 5.9: Examples of Occupations
Variable Minimum Maximum
Data 1 Farm Worker 7 Lobbyist
People 1 Dough Mixer 9 Police Chief
Things 1 Weigher 8 Model Maker
Reasoning 1 Fruit Cutter 6 Chemist
Math 1 Lifeguard 6 Programmer
Language 1 Cleaner 6 Editor
SVP 1 Laborer 8 Surgeon
Strength 1 Statistician 5 Fire Fighter
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Table 5.10: Characteristics by Disability Status
Variable Non-Disabled Moderately Severely
Disabled Disabled
Data 4.1 3.4 2.9
People 2.8 2.3 1.9
Things 3.4 3.2 3.3
Reasoning 3.8 3.4 3.2
Math 2.8 2.4 2.1
Language 3.2 2.7 2.4
SVP 2.6 1.7 1.4
Strength 2.2 2.4 2.5
requirements. Or instead of graphs, Table 5.10 compares the averages of occupational char-
acteristics by disability status. This table supports the graphs in the notion that disabled
workers are employed in occupations with lower levels of all occupational characteristics, with
the exception of strength.
In addition to estimating occupational choice, this research will analyze the effects that
these occupational characteristics have on disability status. For example, perhaps the choice
of disabled individuals to continue in occupations with high strength requirements contribute
to continued disability.
For my analysis involving occupational choice, I discretize the job characteristics to rep-
resent a low or high level of that characteristic. The cut-off values were assigned so that
occupations with the lowest 50 percent of job characteristics had values assigned to 0, and
the other half were assigned to 1. The discrete assignments can be seen in Table 5.11. The
discrete job characteristics were then used to define occupations. For example, an economist
has occupational characteristics of: data 7, people 3, things 2, reasoning 5, math 5, language 5,
svp 8, strength 1. These characteristics would be assigned to discrete values of data 1, people,
1, things, 0, reasoning 1, math 1, language 1, svp 1, strength 0. Other occupations are also
assigned these values including mathematicians, statisticians, and sociologists. Condensing
occupations in this manner results in 50 unique occupations, defined by their occupational
characteristics. These occupations represent the 50 alternatives individuals have when choos-
ing occupations in the model.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of Job Characteristics by Disability Status
(a) Data (b) People
(c) Things (d) Reasoning
(e) Math (f) Language
(g) Specific Vocational Preparation (h) Strength
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Table 5.11: Discretizing Job Characteristics
Variable Cut-Off
Data 4
People 2
Things 3
Reasoning 3
Math 2
Language 3
SVP 6
Strength 2
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Chapter 6
Results
In this chapter, I will present the results of the empirical estimation for both models. First,
I will discuss the results from the model of employment transitions. Then, I will follow with
the results from the model of occupational choice. Finally, I will compare estimates of the
wage equation from both models.
6.1 Employment Transitions
I jointly estimate equations for the employment outcome for the employed, employment
for the jobless, log wages, disability status, and equations for initial tenure, initial disability
status, and attrition. The equations are estimated simultaneously, allowing for unobserved
permanent and time-varying heterogeneity. Coefficient estimates are available in Appendix
Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4.
The accuracy of a model can be determined by comparing the actual values with the pre-
dicted values determined by the model. The first column of Table 6.1 contains the actual
sample proportions of each dependent variable. The second column contains predicted values
from my model obtained by multiplying observed explanatory variables by the predicted co-
efficient values and integrating over the unobserved heterogeneity. These predictions, mapped
to a [0,1] line, and a random uniform draw determine the simulated values of endogenous right
hand side variables which are updated sequentially. The predictions are similar to the actual
sample proportions, suggesting the model fits the data well. Additional evidence that the
dynamic model fits the observed outcomes over time is shown graphically in Table A.1.
Table 6.1: Predicted Values: Employment Transitions
Variable Actual Predicted
Employment Rate 0.887 0.889
No Change in Employment 0.873 0.867
Become Jobless 0.017 0.019
Change Occupation 0.068 0.072
Change Employer 0.036 0.037
Change Both 0.005 0.006
Moderately Disabled 0.039 0.038
Severely Disabled 0.067 0.061
Ln(Wage) (Et = 1) 2.17 2.15
Marginal Effects
In Table 6.2, I present the marginal effects of disability on employment outcomes from
two specifications. The marginal effects presented are one period effects averaged over all
individuals in the sample. Standard errors are parametrically bootstrapped by repeatedly
perturbing estimated coefficients from the variance-covariance matrix 100 times. Model 1
treats the endogenous variables (SEt , S
D
t ) as exogenous by not controlling for the unobserved
heterogeneity. It produces biased effects of these variables. Model 2, the preferred model, uses
the Discrete Factor Random Effects method to control for unobserved heterogeneity with four
permanent and two time-varying mass points.
The majority of marginal effects calculated from the model that does not control for unob-
served heterogeneity (Model 1) are dampened compared to the model that uses the Discrete
Factor Random Effects method (Model 2). Thus, neglecting to control for unobserved differ-
ences would result in an overestimation of the impact of a moderate disability on employment
outcomes. This finding supports the justification hypothesis of disability reporting. Con-
versely, the majority of marginal effects of a severe disability are magnified. This result is
compatible with the stigma effect in reporting a disability. As the moderately and severely
disabled have been shown to be distinct groups, it is highly plausible that they would face
different motivations in reporting disability.
The preferred model in Table 6.2 shows that individuals with a moderate disability are
over 2.5 percentage points less likely to be employed than non-disabled individuals and those
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Table 6.2: Marginal Effects of Disability on Employment Outcomes
Variable Moderate Disability Severe Disability
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Employment Rate (%) -2.71 *** -2.53 *** -35.0 *** -36.7 ***
(1.10) (0.77) (2.84) (2.72)
Log Wage -0.12 *** -0.02 * -0.09 ** -0.21 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
No Change (%) -5.20 *** -4.51 *** -12.6 *** -12.8 ***
(0.88) (1.00) (2.36) (2.65)
Jobless (%) 1.93 *** 2.02 *** 12.2 *** 12.9 ***
(0.33) (0.31) (1.38) (1.29)
Change Occupation (%) 1.77 *** 1.39 ** 2.72 * 2.25
(0.69) (0.68) (1.92) (1.86)
Change Employer (%) 1.04 ** 0.84 * -2.10 *** -2.25 ***
(0.61) (0.54) (0.61) (0.72)
Change Both (%) 0.45 0.27 -0.24 -0.11
(0.27) (0.30) (0.31) (0.64)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
Model 1 = Model without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
Model 2 = Model with 4 permanent and 2 time-varying mass points to account for unobserved heterogneity
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
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who are employed have a slightly lower wage rate. These moderately disabled workers are
over 4.5 percentage points less likely to remain employed at their current job and over two
percentage points more likely to become jobless compared to a worker without a disability.
Moderately disabled workers are about 1.4 percentage points more likely to remain employed
and change occupations and 0.8 percentage points more likely to change employers. In all,
disabled workers are 2.5 percentage points more likely to change occupations, employers, or
both compared to non-disabled workers. As 10.76 percent of non-disabled workers make these
transitions, this implies that moderately disabled workers are 23 percent more likely to make
an employment transition.
The last two columns of Table 6.2 are quite different from the first two columns, again
illustrating the difference between the moderately and severely disabled. The preferred model
shows that the severely disabled who are currently employed are 37 percentage points less
likely to remain employed than non-disabled workers and also earn a significantly lower wage.
Overall, these workers are almost 13 percentage points less likely to remain with their current
job. A large portion of those who leave their current job become non-employed. Still, severely
disabled workers are 2.3 percent more likely to remain employed and change occupations
compared to non-disabled workers. On the other hand, severely disabled workers are also 2.3
percent less likely to change employers. Workers with a severe disability may be physically
incapable of continuing in their line of work and have no choice but to change occupations if
they wish to remain employed. However, those who are able to may prefer to stay with their
same employer so as not to lose health benefits and avoid potential hiring discrimination.
As it has been established that disabled individuals are less likely to remain in their current
job and thus have lower tenure, the effects of occupational and employer tenure on wages are
now considered. Table 6.3 contains estimates of the marginal effects of tenure on log wages.
The first column contains estimates from Model 1, which does not control for unobserved het-
erogeneity. The second column contains estimates from Model 2, which controls for unobserved
heterogeneity. Model 1 predicts that for a disabled worker an additional year of occupational
tenure will add 0.006 and an additional year of employer tenure will add 0.011 to log wages.
46
Model 2, the preferred model, predicts that for disabled workers additional years of occupa-
tional and employer tenure will add 0.001 and 0.008 to log wages, respectively. Thus, without
controls for unobserved heterogeneity, the impact of tenure on wages is over predicted.
The effects of tenure from the preferred model (Model 2) are presented in the second col-
umn of Table 6.3. Occupational tenure increases log wage by 0.002, which translates to about
a 2 cent increase in wages for each year of tenure. Employer tenure has an even larger effect,
increasing log wages by 0.011, or about 10 cents. The squared terms for both types of tenure
indicate that tenure increases wages at a decreasing rate. The effects of occupational and em-
ployer tenure on wages are smaller for disabled workers, although the effect for occupational
tenure is not statistically significant. Reasons for the smaller role of tenure could include dis-
crimination, lack of training received by disabled workers, or productivity differences compared
to non-disabled workers that accumulate each year. Overall, tenure still has a positive effect
on wages for disabled workers.
Table 6.3: Marginal Effects of Tenure on Log Wages
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Occupational Tenure 0.007 *** 0.002 ***
Occupational Tenure Squared/100 -0.004 ** -0.005 **
Occupational Tenure*Disability -0.001 * -0.001
Employer Tenure 0.013 *** 0.011 ***
Employer Tenure Squared/100 -0.018 *** -0.030 ***
Employer Tenure*Disability -0.002 *** -0.003 ***
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Model 1 = Model without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
Model 2 = Model with 4 permanent and 2 time-varying mass points
Dynamic Effects
While per period marginal effects are a good starting point for discerning the impact of
disability on employment outcomes, they do not capture the dynamics of the model. Simula-
tions are conducted to analyze the marginal effects over time. In the first set of simulations,
individuals are simulated to be non-disabled. Next, individuals are simulated to become mod-
erately disabled starting in the second wave and remain disabled. The same simulation is then
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conducted for severely disabled individuals. All groups are simulated to remain employed with
their current employer in their current occupation. The simulated hourly wages earned by
each group are then graphed, and are contained in Figure 6.1. Log wages are retransformed
to dollars using a smearing factor.1
The impact of a disability on wages, holding employment transitions constant, is shown in
Figure 6.1. The onset of disability is indicated in the graph as time “0”. Following the onset of
disability, there is a sharp decline in wages. This initial drop represents a 57 cent loss in wages
for moderately disabled workers, and a $1.36 loss for severely disabled workers. For a full time
moderately or severely disabled worker, this is a loss of about $1,190 and $2,804, respectively,
in the first year of disability.2 For both types of disability, the gap between own wages and
the wages of non-disabled workers grows with length of time disabled. Thus, disability causes
not only a loss in wages, but also a decline in the returns to experience.
In the next simulations, all individuals who are employed in wave one are simulated to
be non-disabled, and then incur a disability starting in wave two (time “0”). From this
point four different scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, workers are simulated to
remain employed with their current employer in their current occupation for the remainder
of the survey. In the second scenario, workers are simulated to change occupations in the
second period and then remain in the same occupation. Next, workers are simulated to change
employers in the second period, and finally workers are simulated to change both occupations
and employers in the second period. The results are depicted in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
Figure 6.2 shows the results when workers are simulated to have a moderate disability.
Workers who remain in the same occupation with their same employer (or those who have
“no change”) serve as a comparison for the employment transitions.3 The figure shows that
changing occupations or employers significantly decreases the hourly wage rate of moderately
1Recall that E[y] = e(Xβ)e(0.5σ
2). Thus, the homoskedastic smearing factor is calculated as e(0.5σ
2) and is
multiplied by the retransformed wages.
2Yearly losses due to disability for three years following disability onset and for each employment transition
are contained in Appendix Table A.1.
3In the first wave, the average person has 11.8 years of occupational tenure and 8.2 years of employer tenure.
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Figure 6.1: Simulated Wages by Disability Status
disabled workers compared to those who stay with their job. In the period in which the
transition is made, workers who change occupations or employers earn wages that are 14 or 19
cents lower, respectively, compared to those who remain in their same job. To put this drop in
perspective, a worker with five years of employer tenure who changes employers will experience
about the same drop in wages as if he lost one year of education. Workers who change both
occupations and employers experience an even larger drop in wages. The gap between workers
who do not change jobs and workers who change occupations widens over time, while the
gap closes for those who change employers. The difference for moderately disabled workers
who make either transition is still statistically significant three years following the transition.4
These results are suggestive of a significant loss of wages from changing occupations and/or
changing employers that perpetuates for at least three years. Further, occupational changes
appear to have a more detrimental long-term affect than employer changes.
495 percent confidence intervals around the simulated wages are contained in Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3.
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Figure 6.2: Simulated Wages of Moderately Disabled Workers
Figure 6.3: Simulated Wages of Severely Disabled Workers
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Simulated wages across time for severely disabled workers are depicted in Figure 6.3. Sim-
ilar to moderately disabled workers, severely disabled workers who change occupations ex-
perience a significant drop in wage. The initial decline in wages is about 13 cents, and the
difference between occupation-changers and those without a transition increases to 19 cents
after three years. However, the effect of changing employers is not statistically significant.
Recall, though, that severely disabled workers are less likely to change employers compared
to non-disabled individuals. The finding that tenure has a smaller effect on wages for individ-
uals who are more severely disabled is consistent with previous findings regarding returns to
education and human capital. The smaller effect can be explained by both differences in real
returns from tenure (i.e. training, etc.) or discrimination. Overall, the results still suggest
that severely disabled workers are adversely affected by changing occupations.
6.2 Occupational Characteristics
In this section, I present the results from the joint estimation of equations for employment,
occupational choice, wages, disability status, initial disability status, and attrition. I present
estimates where I have not controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, referred to as Model 1,
and where I have used the Discrete Factor Random Effects Method with four permanent mass
points to control for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, referred to as Model 2.5 The second
model is the preferred model, as it reduces bias caused by unobservables across equations. The
predictions from this model are compared to actual sample proportions in Table 6.4, to gauge
the fit of the model. The predictions for disability status, employment rate, and occupational
characteristics are all very similar to the actual proportions, suggesting that the model is
accurate.
Marginal Effects
5Note that in the analysis of the previous section, four permanent and two time-varying mass points were
used, whereas here there is no time-varying heterogeneity. The number of mass points is determined by adding
mass points until the likelihood function fails to significantly improve, and thus may vary across models. In
this model, adding time-varying heterogeneity did not improve the fit of the model.
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Table 6.4: Predicted Values: Occupational Choice
Variable Actual Predicted
Moderately Disabled 0.039 0.039
Severely Disabled 0.067 0.067
Employment Rate 0.887 0.889
Data 0.49 0.48
People 0.57 0.62
Things 0.46 0.46
Reasoning 0.61 0.62
Math 0.62 0.63
Language 0.43 0.47
SVP 0.52 0.51
Strength 0.37 0.37
Ln(Wage) (Et = 1) 2.17 2.18
The marginal effects of disability on employment rates and occupational choice are pre-
sented in Table 6.5. Marginal effects are calculated for both moderate and severe disabilities,
in reference to non-disabled individuals. Model 1, which does not control for unobserved
heterogeneity, produces larger estimates than Model 2, which controls for permanent unob-
served heterogeneity. This suggests that treating all variables as exogenous produces inflated
estimates.
The calculated marginal effects from the Discrete Factor Random Effects Method (Model
2) reveal that moderately disabled individuals are slightly less likely to be employed and
severely disabled individuals are significantly less likely to be employed compared to non-
disabled individuals.6 The results also reveal that conditional on employment, there is selection
into occupations by disability status. Moderately and severely disabled workers are less likely
to select occupations with high skill requirements, with the exception of strength. Workers
with any degree of disability are least likely to choose occupations that require a high amount
of reasoning, math, or training (SVP). Many of the occupations that have high strength
requirements have low requirements for the other characteristics. That disabled workers are
employed in low skill jobs with high physical requirements may be representative of the lack
6Note that in this analysis, unlike in the previous section where employment was estimated separately for
the employed and jobless, only one employment equation is estimated.
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Table 6.5: Marginal Effects of Disability on Occupational Choice
Variable Moderate Disability Severe Disability
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Employment Rate -0.50 ** -0.47 ** -6.67 *** -6.73 ***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.38) (0.32)
Data -7.54 *** -2.69 *** -3.78 *** -1.54 **
(1.39) (0.90) (0.85) (0.84)
People -4.93 *** -1.22 * -3.04 *** -0.82 *
(0.99) (0.87) (0.81) (0.57)
Things -4.47 *** -3.06 *** -3.53 *** -2.12 ***
(1.09) (0.77) (1.01) (0.53)
Reasoning -9.83 *** -6.25 *** -4.97 *** -3.08 ***
(1.42) (1.51) (0.91) (0.93)
Math -8.91 *** -5.50 *** -4.98 *** -2.96 ***
(1.44) (1.42) (0.96) (0.92)
Language -6.79 *** -3.01 *** -3.73 *** -1.51 **
(1.26) (1.03) (0.93) (0.70)
SVP -11.58 *** -5.36 *** -6.11 *** -3.16 ***
(1.87) (1.35) (1.18) (1.03)
Strength 1.81 ** 0.94 0.20 0.08
(1.04) (1.22) (0.82) (0.73)
Note: Bootstrapped standard deviations are in parentheses.
Model 1 = Model without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
Model 2 = Model with 4 permanent mass points to account for permanent unobserved heterogneity
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
of opportunities available to this group. The notion that there are barriers to certain types of
employment is an important piece of the employment puzzle regarding disabled individuals.
Table 6.5 also shows that moderately disabled workers are less likely than severely disabled
workers to be employed in occupations with any of the non-physical characteristics. As many
severe disabilities are physical limitations, these workers may have adapted to their disability
by improving their mental skills. However, note that very few severely disabled individuals
are employed, so the results for the severely disabled are not as robust as for the moderately
disabled.
Having controlled for non-random selection into occupations, I now interpret the impact
of occupational characteristics on both disability status and wages. Table 6.6 contains the
results for the marginal effects of the characteristics on disability status. The majority of the
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Table 6.6: Marginal Effects of Occupational Characteristics on Disability
Variable Moderate Severe
Disability Disability
Data 0.27 -0.11
(0.22) (0.27)
People -0.41 *** 0.27 ***
(0.15) (0.11)
Things -0.30 ** 0.11
(0.14) (0.11)
Reasoning -0.32 -0.02
(0.27) (0.18)
Math 0.11 -0.04
(0.18) (0.19)
Language -0.30 ** 0.32 **
(0.18) (0.18)
SVP -0.03 -0.24
(0.21) (0.28)
Strength -0.27 *** 0.28 ***
(0.13) (0.09)
Note: Bootstrapped standard deviations are in parentheses.
Model with 4 permanent mass points to account for permanent unobserved heterogneity
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
marginal effects are small, less than one percentage point. Although small, occupations that
require working with people, things, reasoning, language, training, and strength decrease the
probability of having a moderate disability, whereas working with data and math increase the
odds of a moderate impairment. Occupations that have all of these characteristics include
technicians, inspectors, storekeepers, and utility workers. Although these jobs do not require
high amounts of strength, they are very active, hands-on jobs, and likely have a higher incidence
of work related injuries than desk jobs. Occupations that require work with people, things,
language, and strength, but don’t require work with data, reasoning, math, and training have a
higher probability of causing a severe disability. Examples of such occupations are professional
athletes, drivers, performers, and physical therapy aides. Workers in these professions are more
likely to be faced with severe work-related accidents, such as back injuries and paralysis.
Table 6.7 describes the marginal effects of occupational characteristics on log wages for
disabled workers. Working with data, people, things, reasoning, math, language, and strength
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Table 6.7: Marginal Effects of Occupational Characteristics on Wages of Disabled Workers
Variable Log Wages
Data 0.055 **
(0.029)
People 0.054 **
(0.029)
Things 0.097 ***
(0.020)
Reasoning 0.078 **
(0.044)
Math 0.107 ***
(0.029)
Language 0.086 **
(0.038)
SVP -0.019
(0.029)
Strength 0.071 ***
(0.028)
Note: Bootstrapped standard deviations are in parentheses.
Model with 4 permanent mass points to account for permanent unobserved heterogneity
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
all contribute positively to earned wages. The characteristics with the largest return to wages
are math and things (inanimate objects). However, specific vocational preparation accrued
by disabled workers does not positively affect wages. This could be indicative that training
has a smaller impact on disabled workers, or that employers discriminate against disabled
workers and don’t value their training, as training is found to positively impact the wages of
non-disabled workers.
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Table 6.8: Marginal Effects of Occupational Characteristics on Wages, By Model
Variable Log Wages
Employment Occupational
Transitions Model Choice Model
Data 0.068 *** 0.055 **
(0.024) (0.029)
People 0.121 *** 0.054 **
(0.027) (0.029)
Things 0.065 *** 0.097 ***
(0.015) (0.020)
Reasoning 0.085 ** 0.078 **
(0.040) (0.044)
Math 0.035 0.107 ***
(0.036) (0.029)
Language 0.082 *** 0.086 **
(0.022) (0.038)
SVP 0.008 -0.019
(0.024) (0.029)
Strength 0.079 ** 0.071 ***
(0.025) (0.028)
Note: Bootstrapped standard deviations are in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
6.3 Comparison Across Models
The previous sections describe the results from two models: one focused on the presence
and effect of employment transitions, and the other on occupational choice and characteristics.
Both analyses estimate wage equations, the second analysis doing so more precisely, having
controlled for occupational choice. The first analysis used occupational dummies to control
for occupation; here I have replaced those dummies with occupational characteristics so that
both analyses estimate the wage equation with the same control variables. Table 6.8 compares
the results of these two wage equations. The results suggest that the effect of data, people,
reasoning, SVP, and strength were all overestimated in the analysis that did not control for
occupational choice. The effects of things, math, and language, on the other hand, were all
underestimated. These differences highlight the importance of controlling for occupational
choice, particularly if characteristics of that choice are thought to impact other variables.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this research, I estimate the direct impact of disability on employment outcomes
and the indirect impact of disability on wages via tenure implied by these occupational and
employer transitions. I also measure the effect of disability on occupational choice, and the
effect characteristics implied by this choice have on disability status and wages. Using the
Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, I
estimate two dynamic models of disability and employment controlling for permanent and
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.
The results of the first analysis suggest that workers with either a moderate or severe
disability are more likely to change occupations or employers, with the exception that severely
disabled workers are less likely to change employers. Specifically, moderately disabled workers
are 23 percent more likely to change occupations and/or employers compared to non-disabled
workers. Previous literature on disability and employment outcomes generally consider “job
change” as a change in employers, and this research illustrates the role of occupational change
in these transitions. Further, the importance of controlling for unobserved characteristics is
shown, as estimates of the impact of disability on employment outcomes differ depending on
whether or not one controls for unobserved individual characteristics.
The first analysis also shows the effect of occupational and employer tenure on wages.
Simulating potential employment paths for disabled workers, I find that for moderately disabled
workers, changing occupations is associated with an immediate 14 cent wage loss and changing
employers causes an immediate 19 cent wage loss for moderately disabled workers. Thus,
moderately disabled workers who respond to their disability by changing employers and/or
occupations help explain a significant portion of the wage gap between disabled and non-
disabled workers.
The second analysis finds that disabled workers select occupations differently than non-
disabled workers. Workers with a disability have lower requirement levels of all characteristics,
with the exception of strength. The tasks required by these different occupations are found
to have different effects on disability status and wages. Many occupational characteristics
have different marginal effects on moderate and severe disabilities. Jobs with high data and
low work with people and things, such as technicians, cause moderate disabilities, whereas
jobs with high requirements in things and strength and low requirements in training, such as
professional athletes, cause severe disabilities. Seven of the eight occupational characteristics
have a positive impact on wages for disabled workers. Estimates of characteristics on wages
are more precise in this second analysis, which controls for occupational choice, than the first
analysis.
This dissertation work suggests that there may be barriers to keeping one’s job upon be-
coming disabled as well as entry into certain occupations for disabled individuals. Historically,
disabled workers have faced many barriers to employment, promotions, and equal pay. The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) took great strides to change this, requiring firms to
provide “reasonable accommodations” to disabled workers in an attempt to minimize the
amount of job turnover experienced by disabled workers. This research supports the goal of
the ADA, as changing occupations and employers is found to negatively impact wages. Stricter
requirements added to legislation like the ADA could help lower the transition rates among
this group and provide a better employment outlook for disabled workers. Specific changes
could include extending the ADA to cover all employers or government subsidies for accommo-
dations.1 Other programs, such as occupation-specific vocational rehabilitation, could also aid
in reducing transitions. Barriers to entry into certain occupations may result from disabled
individual being underqualified for these positions. The lack of qualification may come from
1The ADA currently only covers firms with 15 or more employees
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difficulties receiving training or education. Legislation such as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) may help to combat any qualification differences by disability status
encountered early on. IDEA requires states receiving federal money related to the legisla-
tion provide disabled students individualized attention in the classroom to suit the students’
needs. IDEA explicitly covers individuals under the age of 21; accordingly a mechanism to
help individuals who become disabled later in life would also likely be beneficial.
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Appendix A
Supplemental Graphs
Figure A.1: Model Fit - Employment Rate by Disability Tenure
Moderately Disabled
Severely Disabled
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Figure A.2: Simulated Wages - Moderately Disabled
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Figure A.3: Simulated Wages - Severely Disabled
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Table A.1: Yearly Losses
(in 2010 $)
Variable Year One Year Two Year Three
Moderate Disability 1,575 1,670 1,769
For a moderately disabled worker:
Change Occupation 375 437 513
Change Employers 522 533 469
Change Both 897 970 982
Severe Disability 3,712 3,866 4,022
For a severely disabled worker:
Change Occupation 339 395 464
Change Employer -22 139 144
Change Both 317 534 608
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Appendix B
Coefficient Estimates
B.1 Employment Transitions
Table B.1: Coefficient Estimates from Disability Equation (Employment Transitions Model)
(Jointly Estimated with Employment, Wage, Attrition, and Initial Variables Equations)
Variable Moderately Disabled Severely Disabled
Age 0.20 (0.12) -0.44 (0.23)
Age Squared/100 -0.34 (0.29) 1.38 (0.54)
Age Cubed/1000 0.02 (0.02) -0.12 (0.04)
Non-White -0.06 (0.05) -0.01 (0.08)
Unmarried 0.15 (0.04) 0.28 (0.07)
Number of Children -0.06 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03)
Education
Less than High School 0.13 (0.06) 0.34 (0.08)
Some College -0.08 (0.04) -0.35 (0.08)
College -0.47 (0.07) -1.21 (0.13)
More than College -0.59 (0.09) -1.63 (0.20)
Region
North East -0.11 (0.05) -0.09 (0.09)
Mid West -0.09 (0.05) -0.03 (0.08)
West 0.00 (0.05) -0.10 (0.08)
Non-metropolitan 0.09 (0.04) -0.00 (0.08)
Disabledt−1 3.36 (0.07) 2.07 (0.14)
Severely Disabledt−1 -0.69 (0.12) 1.85 (0.14)
For those who did not enter the survey disabled
Time Disabledt−1 1.04 (0.12) 1.24 (0.27)
Time Disabled Squaredt−1 -0.19 (0.05) -0.20 (0.11)
Time Disabled Cubedt−1/10 0.12 (0.05) 0.12 (0.10)
Time Disabledt−1*Severet−1 -0.08 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03)
Time Disabled Squaredt−1*Severet−1 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Time Disabled Cubedt−1*Severet−1/10 -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Enter the survey disabled 0.36 (0.11) 1.35 (0.15)
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Table B.1 (Continued)
Variable Moderately Disabled Severely Disabled
For those who entered the survey disabled
Total Time Disabledt−1 0.36 (0.04) 0.33 (0.04)
Total Time Disabled Squaredt−1/10 -0.19 (0.03) -0.18 (0.03)
Total Time Disabled Cubedt−1/100 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01)
Total Time Disabledt−1*Severet−1 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled Missingt−1 -0.53 (0.09) -0.43 (0.13)
Health Insurancet−1 -0.28 (0.05) -0.41 (0.07)
Non-employed -1.15 (0.15) 4.36 (0.40)
Hours Worked -0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02)
Hours Worked Squared/100 0.03 (0.01) -0.08 (0.02)
Small Employer (<25 Employees) -0.07 (0.05) -0.25 (0.18)
Small Employer*Disabilityt−1 0.01 (0.09) 0.25 (0.22)
Medium Employer (25-99 Employees) -0.17 (0.06) -0.18 (0.20)
Medium Employer*Disabilityt−1 0.07 (0.10) -0.57 (0.30)
Employer Size Missing -0.01 (0.30) 0.87 (0.40)
Occupational Category 1 0.21 (0.10) 0.29 (0.37)
Occupational Category 2 0.18 (0.08) -0.22 (0.28)
Occupational Category 3 0.41 (0.09) 0.28 (0.29)
Occupational Category 4 0.13 (0.08) 0.25 (0.24)
Occupational Category 5 0.11 (0.08) 0.03 (0.25)
Occupational Category 6 0.27 (0.10) 0.11 (0.36)
Occupational Category 7 0.25 (0.09) -0.45 (0.31)
Occupational Category 8 0.41 (0.07) 0.19 (0.23)
Occupational Tenure -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01)
Employer Tenure 0.00 (0.00) -0.11 (0.02)
Unearned Income 0.48 (0.04) 0.51 (0.05)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The omitted category is non-disabled.
Month and Year Dummies were also regressors but are not shown in the above table.
Estimates of permanent and time-varying heterogeneity are available in Table B.5.
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Table B.3: Coefficient Estimates from Employment Equation for the Non-employed (Employ-
ment Transitions Model)
(Jointly Estimated with Disability, Wage, Attrition, and Initial Variables Equations)
Variable Become Employed
Age -0.29 (0.19)
Age Squared/100 0.83 (0.47)
Age Cubed/1000 -0.08 (0.04)
Non-White -0.36 (0.07)
Unmarried -0.13 (0.07)
Number of Children 0.02 (0.03)
Education
Less than High School -0.11 (0.08)
Some College 0.08 (0.07)
College 0.09 (0.10)
More than College 0.46 (0.13)
Region
North East 0.26 (0.08)
Mid West 0.28 (0.08)
West 0.31 (0.08)
Non-Metropolitan -0.01 (0.07)
Disabled 0.30 (0.17)
Severely Disabled -1.58 (0.18)
For those who did not enter the survey disabled
Time Disabled -0.99 (0.44)
Time Disabled Squared 0.41 (0.19)
Time Disabled Cubed/10 -0.38 (0.20)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled 0.03 (0.05)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled Squared -0.02 (0.02)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled Cubed/10 0.02 (0.02)
Enter the survey disabled -0.39 (0.20)
For those who entered the survey disabled
Total Time Disabled -0.18 (0.06)
Total Time Disabled Squared/10 0.12 (0.04)
Total Time Disabled Cubed/100 -0.02 (0.01)
Total Time Disabled*Severe -0.00 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled Missing 0.16 (0.17)
Time Non-employedt−1 -0.32 (0.02)
Local Unemployment Rate -0.02 (0.02)
Unearned Income -0.58 (0.08)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Month and Year Dummies were also regressors but are not shown in the above table.
Estimates of permanent and time-varying heterogeneity are available in Table B.5.
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Table B.4: Coefficient Estimates from Wage Equation (Employment Transitions Model)
(Jointly Estimated with Employment, Disability, Attrition, and Initial Variables Equations)
Variable Wage
Age 0.12 (0.02)
Age Squared/100 -0.22 (0.04)
Age Cubed/1000 0.01 (0.00)
Non-White -0.13 (0.01)
Unmarried -0.09 (0.01)
Number of Children 0.01 (0.00)
Education
Less than High School -0.19 (0.01)
Some College 0.10 (0.01)
College 0.32 (0.01)
More than College 0.46 (0.01)
Region
North East 0.11 (0.01)
Mid West 0.02 (0.01)
West 0.09 (0.01)
Non-metropolitan -0.11 (0.01)
Disabled -0.02 (0.01)
Severely Disabled -0.21 (0.03)
For those who did not enter the survey disabled
Time Disabled -0.04 (0.01)
Time Disabled Squared 0.01 (0.00)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled 0.02 (0.00)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled Squared -0.00 (0.00)
Enter the survey disabled 0.01 (0.02)
For those who entered the survey disabled
Total Time Disabled -0.02 (0.01)
Total Time Disabled Squared/10 0.01 (0.01)
Total Time Disabled Cubed/100 -0.00 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled*Severe 0.00 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled Missing 0.02 (0.02)
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Table B.4 (Continued)
Variable Wage
Hours Worked -0.02 (0.00)
Hours Worked Squared/100 0.03 (0.00)
Hours Worked Cubed/1000 -0.00 (0.00)
Small Employer (<25 Employees) -0.07 (0.00)
Small Employer*Disabilityt−1 -0.03 (0.02)
Medium Employer (25-99 Employees) -0.03 (0.00)
Medium Employer*Disabilityt−1 -0.05 (0.02)
Employer Size Missing -0.16 (0.03)
Occupational Category 1 -0.17 (0.01)
Occupational Category 2 -0.08 (0.01)
Occupational Category 3 -0.20 (0.01)
Occupational Category 4 -0.32 (0.01)
Occupational Category 5 -0.09 (0.01)
Occupational Category 6 -0.11 (0.01)
Occupational Category 7 -0.21 (0.01)
Occupational Category 8 -0.20 (0.01)
Employedt−1 0.03 (0.01)
Occupational Tenure 0.00 (0.00)
Occupational Tenure Squared/100 -0.00 (0.00)
Occupational Tenure*Disability -0.00 (0.00)
Employer Tenure 0.01 (0.00)
Employer Tenure Squared/100 -0.03 (0.00)
Employer Tenure*Disability -0.00 (0.00)
Local Unemployment Rate -0.00 (0.00)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Month and Year Dummies were also regressors but are not shown in the above table.
Estimates of permanent and time-varying heterogeneity are available in Table B.5.
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B.2 Occupational Choice
Table B.6: Conditional Coefficient Estimates from Occupational Choice Equation (Occupa-
tional Choice Model)
(Jointly Estimated with Employment, Wages,
Disability, Attrition, and Initial Variables Equations)
Variable Employed
Occupational Characterisics
Data 0.04 (0.10)
Data*Disabled 0.05 (0.06)
People -3.17 (0.09)
People*Disabled 0.01 (0.05)
Things -1.30 (0.07)
Things*Disabled -0.16 (0.04)
Reasoning -1.46 (0.14)
Reasoning*Disabled -0.11 (0.08)
Math -0.40 (0.11)
Math*Disabled -0.12 (0.07)
Language -4.22 (0.12)
Language*Disabled -0.04 (0.07)
SVP 0.95 (0.12)
SVP*Disabled -0.19 (0.07)
Strength 1.34 (0.10)
Strength*Disabled -0.03 (0.05)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Unconditional parameters including age, marital status, urbanicity, education,
number of children, disability status, and length of time disabled were also estimated,
but are not shown in the above table.
Estimates of permanent heterogeneity are available in Table B.10.
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Table B.7: Coefficient Estimates from Employment Equation (Occupational Choice Model)
(Jointly Estimated with Occupational Choice, Wages,
Disability, Attrition, and Initial Variables Equations)
Variable Employed
Age -0.25 (0.07)
Age Squared/100 0.62 (0.18)
Age Cubed/1000 -0.05 (0.01)
Non-White -0.56 (0.03)
Unmarried -0.54 (0.03)
Number of Children -0.02 (0.01)
Education
Less than High School -0.42 (0.04)
Some College 0.19 (0.03)
College 0.46 (0.04)
More than College 0.83 (0.06)
Region
North East 0.01 (0.04)
Mid West 0.11 (0.03)
West 0.09 (0.03)
Non-Metropolitan -0.05 (0.03)
Disabled -0.07 (0.07)
Severely Disabled -1.26 (0.08)
For those who did not enter the survey disabled
Time Disabled 0.70 (0.08)
Time Disabled Squared -0.80 (0.05)
Time Disabled Cubed/10 1.40 (0.05)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled -0.17 (0.02)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled Squared 0.10 (0.01)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled Cubed/10 -0.15 (0.01)
Enter the survey disabled -0.41 (0.07)
For those who entered the survey disabled
Total Time Disabled -0.12 (0.01)
Total Time Disabled Squared/10 0.15 (0.01)
Total Time Disabled Cubed/100 -0.03 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled*Severe -0.01 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled Missing -0.00 (0.00)
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Table B.7 (Continued)
Variable Employed
Occupational Tenure 0.23 (0.01)
Occupational Tenure Squared/100 -1.09 (0.09)
Occupational Tenure Cubed/1000 0.14 (0.02)
Occupational Tenure*Disability -0.02 (0.01)
Employer Tenure 0.35 (0.01)
Employer Tenure Squared/100 -0.21 (0.01)
Employer Tenure Cubed/100 -0.15 (0.00)
Employer Tenure*Disability -0.00 (0.01)
Time Non-employedt−1 -0.67 (0.01)
Local Unemployment Rate -0.07 (0.01)
Unearned Income -1.06 (0.03)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Month and Year Dummies were also regressors but are not shown in the above table.
Estimates of permanent heterogeneity are available in Table B.10.
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Table B.8: Coefficient Estimates from Disability Equation (Occupational Choice Model)
(Jointly Estimated with Employment, Occupational Choice,
Wages, Attrition, and Initial Variables Equations)
Variable Moderately Disabled Severely Disabled
Age 0.19 (0.09) -0.38 (0.10)
Age Squared/100 -0.30 (0.21) 1.21 (0.25)
Age Cubed/1000 0.02 (0.02) -0.11 (0.01)
Non-White -0.11 (0.05) 0.06 (0.06)
Unmarried 0.15 (0.04) 0.28 (0.06)
Number of Children -0.05 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Education
Less than High School 0.09 (0.05) 0.35 (0.07)
Some College -0.05 (0.04) -0.35 (0.07)
College -0.41 (0.07) -1.12 (0.12)
More than College -0.53 (0.09) -1.42 (0.18)
Region
North East -0.11 (0.05) -0.11 (0.08)
Mid West -0.10 (0.05) -0.10 (0.07)
West -0.03 (0.05) -0.09 (0.07)
Non-metropolitan 0.07 (0.04) 0.02 (0.06)
Disabledt−1 3.21 (0.09) 1.78 (0.14)
Severely Disabledt−1 -0.80 (0.13) 2.05 (0.13)
For those who did not enter the survey disabled
Time Disabledt−1 1.05 (0.12) 1.37 (0.25)
Time Disabled Squaredt−1 -0.20 (0.05) -0.26 (0.10)
Time Disabled Cubedt−1/10 0.13 (0.05) 0.17 (0.09)
Time Disabledt−1*Severet−1 -0.07 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03)
Time Disabled Squaredt−1*Severet−1 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Time Disabled Cubedt−1*Severet−1/10 -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Enter the survey disabled 0.38 (0.11) 1.57 (0.14)
For those who entered the survey disabled
Total Time Disabledt−1 0.36 (0.04) 0.32 (0.04)
Total Time Disabled Squaredt−1/10 -0.19 (0.03) -0.18 (0.02)
Total Time Disabled Cubedt−1/100 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.00)
Total Time Disabledt−1*Severet−1 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled Missingt−1 -0.50 (0.09) -0.40 (0.11)
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Table B.8 (Continued)
Variable Moderately Disabled Severely Disabled
Health Insurancet−1 -0.31 (0.05) -0.41 (0.06)
Non-employed -1.47 (0.13) 2.54 (0.28)
Hours Worked -0.05 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Hours Worked Squared/100 0.03 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Small Employer (<25 Employees) -0.03 (0.05) -0.03 (0.16)
Small Employer*Disabilityt−1 -0.06 (0.09) -0.31 (0.19)
Medium Employer (25-99 Employees) -0.13 (0.06) -0.03 (0.18)
Medium Employer*Disabilityt−1 0.02 (0.10) -0.92 (0.27)
Occupational Characterisics
Data 0.19 (0.09) -0.07 (0.24 )
Data*Disabled -0.22 (0.15) -0.04 (0.40)
People -0.11 (0.08) -0.01 (0.20)
People*Disabled -0.02 (0.13) 0.56 (0.30)
Things -0.09 (0.06) -0.04 (0.13)
Things*Disabled -0.06 (0.09) 0.20 (0.22)
Reasoning -0.30 (0.13) 0.12 (0.33)
Reasoning*Disabled 0.47 (0.21) -0.21 (0.53)
Math -0.09 (0.11) -0.04 (0.27)
Math*Disabled 0.29 (0.18) 0.14 (0.44)
Language -0.09 (0.10) 0.12 (0.28)
Language*Disabled 0.08 (0.15) 0.43 (0.41)
SVP 0.01 (0.10) -0.53 (0.25)
SVP*Disabled -0.08 (0.17) 0.38 (0.41)
Strength -0.08 (0.07) 0.33 (0.13)
Strength*Disabled 0.02 (0.10) -0.08 (0.20)
Occupational Tenure -0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Employer Tenure -0.00 (0.00) -0.17 (0.01)
Unearned Income 0.48 (0.04) 0.55 (0.05)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Month and Year Dummies were also regressors but are not shown in the above table.
Estimates of permanent heterogeneity are available in Table B.10.
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Table B.9: Coefficient Estimates from Wage Equation (Occupational Choice Model)
(Jointly Estimated with Employment, Occupational Choice,
Disability, Attrition, and Initial Variables Equations)
Variable Wage
Age 0.11 (0.01)
Age Squared/100 -0.24 (0.03)
Age Cubed/1000 0.02 (0.00)
Non-White -0.07 (0.00)
Unmarried -0.07 (0.00)
Number of Children 0.01 (0.00)
Education
Less than High School -0.13 (0.01)
Some College 0.07 (0.00)
College 0.25 (0.01)
More than College 0.36 (0.01)
Region
North East 0.09 (0.00)
Mid West 0.03 (0.00)
West 0.12 (0.00)
Non-metropolitan -0.12 (0.00)
Disabled -0.21 (0.02)
Severely Disabled 0.02 (0.04)
For those who did not enter the survey disabled
Time Disabled -0.02 (0.03)
Time Disabled Squared -0.00 (0.01)
Time Disabled Cubed 0.00 (0.01)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled 0.01 (0.01)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled Squared -0.00 (0.00)
Severe Disability*Time Disabled Cubed 0.00 (0.00)
Enter the survey disabled -0.02 (0.03)
For those who entered the survey disabled
Total Time Disabled -0.00 (0.01)
Total Time Disabled Squared/10 -0.00 (0.01)
Total Time Disabled Cubed/100 -0.00 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled*Severe 0.00 (0.00)
Total Time Disabled Missing 0.04 (0.02)
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Table B.9 (Continued)
Variable Wage
Hours Worked -0.05 (0.00)
Hours Worked Squared/100 0.11 (0.00)
Hours Worked Cubed/1000 -0.01 (0.00)
Small Employer (<25 Employees) -0.12 (0.00)
Small Employer*Disabilityt−1 0.00 (0.02)
Medium Employer (25-99 Employees) -0.07 (0.00)
Medium Employer*Disabilityt−1 -0.08 (0.02)
Employer Size Missing -0.10 (0.04)
Occupational Characterisics
Data -0.00 (0.01)
Data*Disabled 0.06 (0.03)
People 0.01 (0.01)
People*Disabled 0.04 (0.03)
Things 0.06 (0.00)
Things*Disabled 0.04 (0.02)
Reasoning 0.01 (0.01)
Reasoning*Disabled 0.07 (0.04)
Math 0.04 (0.01)
Math*Disabled 0.07 (0.04)
Language 0.09 (0.01)
Language*Disabled -0.01 (0.03)
SVP 0.08 (0.01)
SVP*Disabled -0.10 (0.03)
Strength -0.01 (0.01)
Strength*Disabled 0.08 (0.02)
Occupational Tenure 0.00 (0.00)
Occupational Tenure Squared/100 0.05 (0.01)
Occupational Tenure Cubed/1000 -0.01 (0.00)
Occupational Tenure*Disability -0.02 (0.01)
Occupational Tenure Squared*Disability 0.10 (0.05)
Occupational Tenure Cubed*Disability -0.01 (0.00)
Employer Tenure 0.01 (0.00)
Employer Tenure Squared/100 -0.01 (0.01)
Employer Tenure Cubed/100 -0.00 (0.00)
Employer Tenure*Disability -0.02 (0.01)
Employer Tenure Squared*Disability 0.19 (0.04)
Employer Tenure Cubed*Disability -0.04 (0.01)
Local Unemployment Rate -0.01 (0.00)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Month and Year Dummies were also regressors but are not shown in the above table.
Estimates of permanent heterogeneity are available in Table B.10.
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Table B.10: Unobserved Heterogeneity Parameters (Occupational Choice Model)
Point of Support Probability Employment Moderate Severe Wages
Disability Disability
Permanent
1 0.22 Normalized to 0
2 0.19 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.01)
3 0.28 0.15 0.07 -0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.01)
4 0.29 -0.32 -0.09 -0.11 0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.01)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Appendix C
Methods
C.1 Mixed Conditional Logit Estimation
Conditional logit models allow researchers to control for choice-specific variables. This is
in contrast to traditional probit, logit, and multinomial logit models, in which only individual
characteristics are valid controls. Accordingly, I use a mixed conditional logit equation that
combines elements of a conditional logit and a multinomial logit model to estimate occupational
choice, as characteristics of each occupation are likely important aspects of an individuals’
decision.
Recall that in a multinomial logit equation, the probability that individual i selects option
j is given by:
pij =
eXiβj
1 + eXiβ2 + eXiβ3 + ...+ eXiβJ
.
In a conditional logit, the probability that individual i selects option j is given by:
pij =
eXijβ
1 + eXi2β + eXi3β + ...+ eXiJβ
.
For a given individual, in a conditional logit model the individual-specific variables will have
the same value but the choice-specific variables may have different values. The individual-
specific parameters are estimated in the same way as a multinomial logit equation, and in fact
estimating a conditional logit equation with only individual-level variables provides identical
estimates to those of a multinomial logit model. This produces J − 1 parameters for each
individual choice variable, but only one parameter for each choice-specific variable.
Consider the estimation of occupational choice described in the paper, with 50 unique occu-
pations. For simplicity, suppose we consider controls for the individuals’ age (Ai), which varies
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across individuals, and strength required (Sj) in the occupation, which varies by occupation.
The probability that individual i chooses occupation j is:
pij =
eAiβ
0
j+Sijβ
1
1 + eAiβ02+Si2β1 + eAiβ03+Si3β1 + ...+ eAiβ050+Si50β1
.
This would result in 49 coefficients estimated for age and one coefficient estimated for required
strength. A positive coefficient for strength would indicate that individuals are less likely to
select an occupation that requires strength, where as a positive coefficient would suggest that
individuals are more likely to choose occupations that require strength.
The conditional logit model was developed by Daniel McFadden, and more details can be
found in McFadden (1973).
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C.2 Discrete Factor Random Effects Method
The Discrete Factor Random Effects method (DFRE) is a maximum likelihood random
effects method used to control for unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics that
may be correlated across multiple equations. The DFRE method can be implemented either
linearly or non-linearly, and in this research I use the non-linear version, as it is a more flexible
approach.
To control for unobserved characteristics, error terms are decomposed in to three parts: a
permanent component (µ), a time-varying component (νt), and a random component (t). In
a system of two equations, with error terms ξ1t and ξ2t, we have:
ξ1t = µ1 + υ1t + 1t
ξ2t = µ2 + υ2t + 2t.
Not imposing a distribution on the error terms, the joint distribution of the error terms
can be written generally as:
f(ξ1t, ξ2t|µ, t) = f1(1t − µ1 − υ1t)f2(2t − µ2 − υ2t).
Integrating over the distribution of the permanent and time-varying components, the uncon-
ditional joint distribution is given by:
f(ξ1t, ξ2t) =
∫ ∫
f(ξ1t, ξ2t|µ, t)dF (µ)dF (υt).
The cumulative distribution functions of µ and υt are estimated as discrete stepwise func-
tions. The permanent components are allowed K steps, also known as mass points, and the
time-varying components have L points of support. The probability of a particular permanent
mass point is:
ρk = P (µ1t = µ1tk, µ2t = µ2tk)
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and the probability of a time-varying mass point is given by:
ψ` = P (υ1t = υ1t`, υ2t = υ2t`).
These probabilities are estimated by the following equations:
ρk =
exp(γk)
1 +
∑K−1
k′=1 exp(γk′)
ψ` =
exp(γ`)
1 +
∑L−1
`′=1 exp(γ`′)
where the DFRE model iterates to find the best values for γk′ and γ`′ for the K − 1 and L− 1
mass points. The Kth and Lth mass points are not estimated, and are calculated as one minus
the sum of the previous mass point probabilities, as the probabilities must both sum to one.
Using this stepwise approach, the unconditional joint distribution of the error terms can
be approximated by:
f(ξ1t, ξ2t) =
K∑
k=1
ρk
L∑
`=1
ψ`f(ξ1t, ξ2t|µ = µk, υt = υt`).
In estimating the parameters of a model using the Discrete Factor Random Effects method,
an individual’s contribution to the likelihood function is estimated in the same manner:
Li(θ, ρ, ψ) =
K∑
k=1
ρk
L∑
`=1
ψ`Li(θ|µ = µk, υt = υt`).
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